

FROM BABYLON TO TRIPARADEISOS: 323–320 B.C.

THE first stage of the break-up of the empire of Alexander the Great has not been a popular subject in recent years. Yet despite this lack of attention, a wholly satisfactory exposition of the source material relating to the political events of the period has not yet been written. Earlier writers, with rare exceptions, have been hamstrung in their interpretations by an over-rigid or static view of Macedonian *Staatsrecht*, elucidation of which was thought to be the key to the problems. This article returns to the sources. And while the condition of our sources may preclude a final definitive interpretation, I hope to show that a more realistic account can be written than has been produced so far.

I. THE NEW KING

In his account of the first discussions of the diadochi at Babylon after Alexander's death in June 323 B.C., Curtius gives details of a proposed settlement which is mentioned only by Justin of our other sources. By it, Pithon, one of the nobles who supported Perdikkas, designated Perdikkas and Leonnatus as *tutores* for the child with which Roxane was pregnant; Craterus and Antipater were to control affairs in Europe; and an oath was sworn that all present would submit to a king who was a son of Alexander.¹ Little attention has been paid to this passage by modern writers, who regularly dismiss Curtius' information when they mention it at all;² yet it has as good a claim as any of our evidence to be taken seriously, since it seems very likely that Curtius knew and used the well-informed Hieronymus of Cardia.³ His information must not therefore simply be dismissed or ignored.

When Alexander died on June 10, 323,⁴ he left no heir. The nearest he had come to designating a successor was his symbolic gift of his signet ring to Perdikkas, who had become Alexander's chief confidant since the death of Hephaestion.⁵ This marked out Perdikkas as chief among those present. But what of those who were absent? The previous autumn the ever-willing Craterus had been sent with Polyperchon to escort 10,000 veterans to Macedon; on his arrival Craterus was to replace Antipater as governor of Europe.⁶ He had as yet penetrated no further than Cilicia, apparently unwilling to precipitate a crisis in his relations with Antipater.⁷ Craterus might be expected to have had strong views on the succession, and it was only by accident that he was absent. Similarly Antipater. Antipater could not have welcomed being replaced by Craterus; he might have obeyed Alexander, but he was likely to be intractable if given instructions by Perdikkas.

A third problem was the creation of the last months of Alexander's life. Roxane was now pregnant; and since Alexander had recognised her as his lawful wife, her child, if male, would have been recognised by Alexander as his heir.⁸ In the present circumstances Roxane's pregnancy was a complication which Perdikkas would no doubt have been glad

¹ C(urtius) x 7.8–9; cf. J(ustin) xiii 2.13–14. J. has Craterus and Antipater also as *tutores*, a quite unimportant variant in view of J.'s habitual carelessness: it has been taken seriously only by Miltner, *Klio* xxvi (1933) 50.

² Exceptions are Schur, *RhM* lxxxiii (1934) 133–4, and Fontana, 'Le lotte per la successione di Alessandro Magno' (cited Lotte) in *Atti della accademia di scienze, lettere e arti di Palermo*, ser. 4, xviii 2 (1957–8 [Palermo, 1960]) 116–17.

³ See APPENDIX 1.

⁴ For the date, see APPENDIX 2.

⁵ For refs. cf. Berve, *Das Alexanderreich auf prosopo-*

graphischer Grundlage (Munich, 1926) ii 315–16. Fontana, *Lotte* 116 and 274–5, follows Tarn, *JHS* xli (1921) 1 ff., in rejecting the ring story. The only reason is that it is from the 'vulgate', which—by definition!—must be wrong: see Badian, *HSPh* lxxii (1967) 185, n. 12.

⁶ A(rrian) *Anabasis* vii 12.3–4.

⁷ D(iodorus) xviii 4.1; 12.1. Cf. Badian, *JHS* lxxxii (1961) 34 ff. (now in Griffith (ed.), *Alexander the Great, the main problems* [Heffer, Cambridge, 1966] 205 ff.).

⁸ C. x 6.9; J. xiii 2.5; cf. Schwahn, *Klio* xxiv (1931) 311.

to have avoided. The customary Macedonian procedure, where a recognised male heir existed but was too young to rule, seems to have been to appoint a relation of the child as regent, to rule until he grew up. The appointment of the regent, as of a new king, was approved by the army assembly. In this way Philip II had started his reign as regent for the young Amyntas.

An army assembly had therefore to be summoned. Perdikkas, we may assume, would in normal circumstances have exploited Alexander's favour to have himself approved as king by the army. Procedurally this would have been quite straightforward. On the other hand, had a royal heir survived, Perdikkas would have exploited Alexander's favour to have himself appointed regent; this would also have been quite normal. But Perdikkas could in practice do neither of these things. He could not afford to create the inevitable jealousy of having himself appointed king in case Roxane's child proved to be male: for this would at once open the possibility of the child's exploitation by anyone unscrupulous enough among Perdikkas' opponents who was prepared to depict Perdikkas as a usurper. On the other hand he could only with difficulty expect approval for a regency for a child which was not yet born, and which, if female, would have no royal title.

The stage was set for a struggle. The nearest convenient equivalent to a Macedonian army assembly was the assembly of Macedonian troops present at Babylon. Perdikkas had therefore no alternative to submitting his proposals to this body. To make his own situation as Alexander's favourite clear, he had Alexander's throne, diadem and robes set up before the assembly: to these Perdikkas ostentatiously added Alexander's ring.⁹ Perdikkas thus began with a great advantage: whatever decision was taken he intended that he should be the chief beneficiary. The sole—but crucial—abnormality in the situation was Roxane's expected baby: the choice seemed to be between gambling on its being female, in which case Perdikkas could be appointed king at once, and appointing Perdikkas regent. When Perdikkas came to address the assembly he chose to try to have the best of both worlds in the present uncertainty: to appoint an interim ruler¹⁰ until it became clear whether a regency of the traditional type would be necessary. It was clear whom he intended to be chosen.

But his proposal had its dangers, for it made the army conscious of the uncertainty, and uncertainty was just what the troops did not want. The majority of them can by this time have been enthusiastic only for money and demobilisation:¹¹ uncertainty ensured that both would be delayed. The interest of the troops was therefore in reaching a firm and lasting decision. The indecisiveness of Perdikkas' proposal allowed others to try to exploit the attitude of the troops. At Susa Nearchus had married Barsine, whose mother had borne Alexander a son Heracles.¹² Alexander had never recognised this child, and Nearchus' proposal that he should now be considered as Alexander's successor was rejected by the assembly in uproar:¹³ Nearchus was a mere Greek, Heracles was half-Persian and not recognised by Alexander. Nearchus could not expect to gain influence so easily.¹⁴

Ptolemy spoke next, and although his proposal was more subtle, its aim was non-traditional: to establish a committee of Alexander's 'friends' which would govern the empire by majority verdict.¹⁵ Ptolemy was clearly claiming that all the high nobles were of equal importance, that Perdikkas' apparent supremacy was illusory, and that their claimed equivalence in prestige should be recognised by the assembly's recognising them as equal

⁹ C. x 6.1-4.

¹⁰ C. x 6.9 is vague as to what Perdikkas intended: *interim a quibus regi velitis destinare*. *A priori* we should expect to see Perdikkas striving for his own advancement, and the vagueness of the plural may be the fault of C.'s rhetoric. J. xiii 2.5 mentions only the proposal to await the child's birth.

¹¹ So Schwahn, *Klio* xxiv (1931) 306 ff.

¹² Refs. in Berve, *Das Alexanderreich* ii 102 f.; 271 f.; cf. APPENDIX 1.

¹³ C. x 6.10-12.

¹⁴ It is perhaps instructive to notice that Nearchus disappears until 316, when he was an officer of Antigonos: D. xix 19.5. Eumenes' career is a textbook example of how a Greek could benefit from discretion.

¹⁵ C. x 6.13-15; cf. APPENDIX 1.

in power.¹⁶ Ptolemy's proposal was subtly aimed at undermining Perdiccas' pre-eminence, and although Curtius says that it found some support, Perdiccas' supporter Aristonous did not have much difficulty in pressing Perdiccas' own claim to the kingship. This was widely approved, for it would produce a certain and immediate result, and Perdiccas was urged to take the royal insignia.¹⁷

While this enthusiasm for him as Alexander's successor must have gratified Perdiccas, it was not the solution which he himself favoured, for it made no provision for Roxane's child—a difficulty which he insisted on having resolved, and which his own proposal had been intended to eliminate. As a result he did not at once accept the invitation of the assembly, but retired, presumably to consult his supporters. Curtius' own interpretation here has its effect, for he depicts Perdiccas, Tiberius-fashion, hesitating in order to make the invitation so pressing as to be irresistible.¹⁸ Modesty was not a Macedonian characteristic. There is no obvious personal or social reason why Perdiccas should have hesitated. He clearly hesitated for a very important political reason, which can only be that acceptance would leave unsolved the problem of ultimate succession. He could not be secure, whether as king or regent, until Roxane's child was born. For this reason he had initially proposed to wait for it; for this reason he placed the greatest possible importance on delay until a definitive solution could be reached.

Unfortunately for Perdiccas the troops were hostile to delay and to temporary solutions, and his refusal to accept the throne when it was offered gave the opportunity for Meleager, one of the infantry commanders, to exploit the feeling of the troops and attack Perdiccas' personal ambitions in his own interest.¹⁹ Curtius presents him—with how much truth we cannot say—as a demagogue, urging the troops to plunder the treasury since they alone were the heirs of Alexander.²⁰ If any of this colouring does represent Hieronymus' contemporary account, here is further evidence that the troops were eager for pay: discharge might be expected to follow the definitive appointment of a ruler. Diodorus also confirms that Meleager showed more initiative than was good for him in the course of the bargaining; and later developments suggest that he was trying to use the troops' dissatisfaction to have himself elevated. The result of his intervention was a near-riot.²¹

At this point the name of Arrhidaeus began to circulate in the assembly, introduced, says Curtius, by one of the lowest of the Macedonians.²² Arrhidaeus was Alexander's half-brother and a mental defective: presumably his deficiency was the reason why Perdiccas had discounted his acceptability, for Alexander had never counted him a threat, while he had eliminated the other remaining Argeads.²³ But in the present crisis Arrhidaeus had three outstanding merits: he was a son of Philip, he was present, and he was alive. The prospective chaos of an empty throne would shatter the mundane ambitions of the troops: they did not want more fighting, still less did they want a civil war.²⁴ In the circumstances Arrhidaeus was not only a serious candidate for their approval: Perdiccas' own reluctance

¹⁶ He took this line also in his *History of Alexander*: cf. my article in *CQ* n.s. xix (1969).

¹⁷ C. x 6.16-18.

¹⁸ His interpretation may have come from his own experience, as a senator, of Tiberius' accession: cf. Badian, *Studies in Greek and Roman History* (Oxford, 1964) 262 f.

¹⁹ On Meleager's background, cf. Berve, *Das Alexanderreich* ii 249 f.

²⁰ C. x 6.20-4.

²¹ D. xviii 2 (a jumble chronologically, but Hieronymus' outline is there); C. x 7.1.

²² C. x 7.1-2: *ignotus ex infima plebe*. J. xiii 2.8 gives Meleager, which C. must have said had it been correct.

²³ Refs. in Berve, *Das Alexanderreich* ii 385. Fontana, *Lotte* 128 f., disbelieves Arrhidaeus' mental deficiency; but Badian's arguments, *Studies* 264, show her doubts to be groundless. C. does not mention the deficiency, but presents a diffident and unambitious youth thrust forward against his will. If we accept a Claudian date for C. (so, most recently, Sumner, *AUMLA* xv [1961] 30 ff.), C. might have been embarrassed to seem to echo in his book—which the historian emperor might well read—contemporary rumours of Claudius' own incapacity (cf. Suet. *Claudius* 3-4), as well as the notoriously similar way in which he became emperor.

²⁴ For long after 323 it remained very difficult to persuade Macedonian troops to fight each other.

showed that he was the only possible choice. Pithon tried to draw the assembly's attention back to Perdikkas' position, which until this moment had been the crux of the situation, but he had no success. A candidate who could be immediately acclaimed was available. It did not take long for Meleager to exploit the situation, to produce Arrhidaeus to the troops, and have him enthusiastically acclaimed king under his father's name Philip.²⁵

Events seemed to have gone wildly wrong for Perdikkas: the problem which he had presented to the assembly had been ignored as irrelevant. In the process, it must have seemed, his position of supremacy, which Alexander himself had given him, had been heavily eroded. Yet all was not lost. For Meleager's tumultuous success with the troops—mainly the infantry of the phalanx, sections of which he had been accustomed to command—found its reaction in the other nobles, who closed ranks against Meleager. Meleager might yet be isolated if a consensus of the nobles could be seen to continue to support Perdikkas: personal aspirations would certainly be better served by supporting Perdikkas' supremacy than by supporting Meleager's, for Meleager's favour was likely to be as unstable as the manner of his elevation. Noble support for Perdikkas now seems to have consolidated on a large scale, for Photius' version of Arrian's *Successors*—also based on Hieronymus of Cardia—records a list of the senior nobles who chose either side: on the infantry side he names Meleager alone; on the cavalry (Perdikkas'), together with Perdikkas, Leonnatus, Ptolemy, Lysimachus, Aristonous, Pithon (all *somatophylakes* of Alexander),²⁶ Seleucus and Eumenes of Cardia.²⁷ This was a formidable opposition for Meleager, for it meant—if he continued the struggle—that he had to maintain the support of his troops against the most distinguished and influential of Alexander's closest friends.

At this point Curtius records the proposed settlement with which we began. The political context makes it clear that it must represent the first flowering of the cavalry nobles' consensus against Meleager. Curtius introduces it as the opinion of the *principes*, more particularly as the plan of Perdikkas, as opposed to that of the *vulgus* which had just acclaimed Arrhidaeus as Philip.²⁸ It is not clear that the proposal was intended to be merely temporary:²⁹ it is not presented as such by Curtius. What is clear is that it gained the support of Perdikkas' group of nobles, and that they were prepared to accept its terms as their basis for negotiation with Meleager, facts which suggest that it had at least some elements which all were prepared to accept as part of a final settlement. The terms paid no attention to Philip Arrhidaeus—a mistake, as it turned out, for once he was acclaimed, the prestige of the troops was tied to his general recognition. The crucial problem was still, it seemed to these nobles, Roxane's child: Arrhidaeus was ignored as irrelevant. For the purpose of their agreement it was necessary to assume that Roxane's child would be male: therefore provision had to be made for a regency. To achieve the consensus Perdikkas seems to have been prepared to compromise his pre-eminence, at least for the present, and to share the guardianship with Leonnatus.³⁰ If Curtius had good information for calling them both *stirpe regia genitos* (he may well be right: both men were from Orestis, and may easily have been connected with the Argeads through the royal house of Orestis),³¹ this agreement will represent as close an approximation to the normal regency as the political circumstances allowed: for Macedonian regents were normally related to their ward; the unusual feature of the dual regency must be a product of the bargaining which produced the consensus.

With the provision that Craterus and Antipater should jointly share Europe we are on

²⁵ C. x 7.4–7.

²⁶ Cf. Berve, *Das Alexanderreich* i 27.

²⁷ A. succ. 2 (= Jacoby, *FGrH* 156 F 1–11).

²⁸ C. x 7.8: *ceterum haec vulgi erat vox, principum alia sententia. E quibus Pithon consilium Perdikkae exsequi coepit. . . .*

²⁹ As Bengtson, *Die Strategie in der hellenistischen Zeit* i (Munich, 1937) 77–8, argues unconvincingly from the fact that it was never put into practice.

³⁰ Cf. Schur, *RhM* lxxxiii (1934) 133.

³¹ So Berve, *Das Alexanderreich* ii 232 (Leonnatus); 313 (Perdikkas).

less firm ground. What should this mean in the context of the struggle at Babylon? As we have already noticed, the proposals of the consensus group must have been generally acceptable to its members, at least as part of a final settlement. This suggests that none of those present was seriously interested in Europe—or rather, was prepared to envisage taking the necessary steps to establish himself there—once Meleager was defeated. It is not difficult to see why. Antipater had been established in control on Alexander's appointment since 334, and would obviously be extremely reluctant to move:³² so, at least, it must have seemed to Craterus, who had now been en route to replace Antipater, on Alexander's orders, for nearly a year: if Craterus at the head of 10,000 veterans and possessing Alexander's orders was reluctant to provoke a struggle with Antipater, it is clear that none of those at Babylon would have welcomed the prospect of challenging him now that Alexander was dead.

Moreover, Alexander's orders to Craterus in themselves also helped to make the command in Europe even less attractive to the men at Babylon. For not only would any prospective successor have to replace Antipater: he would also have to persuade Craterus—and perhaps his veterans—to accept that Alexander's orders had been countermanded by Alexander's successor, whom Craterus might be reluctant to acknowledge. There could be little attraction in the prospect, for after Perdiccas and Leonnatus, Craterus and Antipater must have been regarded by many as the most powerful and influential of the Macedonians, from their long association with Alexander, and Craterus' popularity among the troops.³³ This last point may have been decisive. For since neither of them was present, their names could be incorporated in the proposed settlement both to increase the appearance of consensus among the nobles and to remove some of Meleager's support among the troops by making him appear still more isolated. The means of incorporating them was also at hand, for both had claims to Macedon which none of those at Babylon was prepared to challenge. Recognition of both of their claims was the obvious way out: let them rule Macedon jointly. At Babylon this had the advantage of emphasising the consensus, for the joint guardianship of Perdiccas and Leonnatus would seem to be paralleled in the joint rule in Europe.³⁴ At the same time, none of the men of Babylon can have been disappointed with the possibility of Craterus and Antipater fighting it out—in Europe.³⁵

II. THE COMPROMISE

The initiative did not long remain with Perdiccas' group. Meleager, who had retired with Philip after his acclamation, soon returned with the new king dressed in Alexander's robes, and again secured an overwhelming acclamation from the assembly. Curtius emphasises the troops' satisfaction that a king had been so unexpectedly found who could command their general loyalty, and whether this is Hieronymus' or Curtius' own interpretation, it is entirely consonant with what we should expect.³⁶ At this stage Perdiccas must have realised the nobles' mistake of not recognising the new king, but it was already too late. He now risked losing all in violence. To try to re-assert the dead Alexander's influence he and his supporters, reinforced by the royal pages, took refuge in the mortuary where Alexander's body was lying in state. The mob, led by Meleager, broke down the door and confronted the Perdiccans who were persuaded—they had little alternative—to lay

³² Refs. in Berve, *Das Alexanderreich* ii 46. The title of his 'office' is not clear—nor does it much matter. Cf. Badian, *JHS* lxxxi (1961) 34 ff.; for a different view of Antipater's disposition, cf. Griffith, *PACA* viii (1965) 12 ff.

³³ Refs. in Berve, *Das Alexanderreich* ii 46 f. (Antipater); 225 f. (Craterus).

³⁴ Noted by Schur, *RhM* lxxxiii (1934) 133, but not explained.

³⁵ So Badian, *Studies* 266.

³⁶ C. x 7.10–15.

down their arms. Perdicas narrowly escaped a lynching, and could not now be expected to trust Meleager. He and his supporters took their earliest opportunity of escaping from the palace, after which they secured the support of the Macedonian cavalry.³⁷

The wisdom of this action was seen in the event: for it immediately raised the question of whether the troops of the phalanx would fight a civil war in Philip's name under Meleager's command against Alexander's closest friends and the Macedonian cavalry. Perdicas, says Curtius reasonably, still hoped that he would attract the support of the infantry.³⁸ And this indeed showed signs of beginning to happen the next day when Meleager was faced with some disaffection, apparently after he was discovered in an attempt to murder Perdicas.³⁹ Whatever the truth of the allegation, Perdicas now left the city with the cavalry, which he would scarcely have done had he expected the infantry's disenchantment with Meleager to lead them rapidly to abandon him. The Perdicans put on the pressure. For three days the cavalry cut off food supplies from the city, and threatened devastation to the countryside. Eumenes remained in the city, and later took the credit for so weakening the loyalty of the troops to Meleager that Meleager was compelled to begin negotiations. The negotiations were complicated, but the result was that the infantry and the cavalry were reunited.⁴⁰

So far Curtius takes us. Unfortunately he gives no further details of the compromise which brought the two groups together. We must now turn for elucidation to Arrian, whose *Successors* in Photius' summary here offers much more than Curtius. Arrian's account clearly follows the same chief source as Curtius', for the order of the events is the same: after Arrhidaeus' acclamation Arrian records the dispute between the cavalry and the infantry, giving the leading names on each side; then the embassies which undertook the negotiations, after which follow the details of the agreement between the infantry and cavalry.⁴¹ It is also clear that no important source—that is, ultimately, Hieronymus—regarded the compromise, the terms of which Arrian records here, as part of the final definitive settlement in which the satrapies were also distributed. Arrian separates the two with the purification of the army and the murder of Meleager; Curtius does exactly the same; even Justin follows the same order of events, though he omits Meleager's murder.⁴² This unanimity of the main sources must come from their common chief source, which must be Hieronymus. Since the extant accounts are all much briefer than Hieronymus', a substantial time may have elapsed between the two settlements.

Let us now examine the compromise which ended the threat of civil war. It is implicit in Curtius' account of the negotiations that it involved the Perdicans' recognising Philip Arrhidaeus, and therefore abandoning their insistence on waiting for Roxane's baby.⁴³ This is confirmed explicitly by Arrian;⁴⁴ and its necessity must have been clear from the tenacity with which the infantry had clung to the legitimacy of their acclamation: Philip's recognition by the Perdicans clearly represented the *sine qua non* of a peaceful settlement. But Philip was mentally defective. The troops might be satisfied with him as king, but

³⁷ C. x 7.16–21.

³⁸ C. x 7.21.

³⁹ C. x 8.6. The allegation is so common in ancient politics that it could equally well be true or an invention.

⁴⁰ C. x 8.4–23; Plut. *Eumenes* 3.1. Perhaps Meleager's embassy, over which Perdicas felt cheated, was at this time: D. xviii 2.3.

⁴¹ A. *succ.* 2–3.

⁴² A. *succ.* 3–5; C. x 8.23–10.4; J. xiii 4.5–9. The variants are quite unimportant against this testimony (despite an almost unanimous modern tendency to

treat them as of equal value, and hence to fail to distinguish the compromise from the later definitive settlement): neither Photius' summary of Dexippus (*FGrH* 100 F 8), nor the Heidelberg *Epitome* (*FGrH* 155 F 1), give a sufficiently circumstantial version of events to shake this conclusion. Only Dexippus and Diodorus (xviii 2.4–3.1) have certainly confused the two settlements, and both were quite capable of doing this themselves; the version of the Heidelberg *Epitome* is compatible with the main tradition.

⁴³ Cf. C. x 8.15; 20–3.

⁴⁴ A. *succ.* 3.

the essence of the struggle among the leaders had been for the exercise of real power. The terms of the compromise show who had won.

Let us take the arrangements in Arrian's order.⁴⁵ Antipater is mentioned first, as *strategos* of Europe.⁴⁶ There is no difficulty here, no difficulty in envisaging general agreement: only Craterus might want to challenge Antipater, and Craterus was not at Babylon.

Craterus himself is next. A vast literature has been produced in connection with Craterus' position, yet none of it has taken into account the circumstances in which the compromise settlement was being negotiated. Arrian's text in Photius' summary says that Craterus was agreed to be *προστάτην τῆς Ἀρριδαίου βασιλείας*, which we may translate (uncommittedly) as 'protector of Arrhidaeus' kingdom'.⁴⁷ The only other mention of Craterus' *prostasia* is in Photius' epitome of Dexippus' epitome of Arrian, which has no claim to be treated either as independent evidence or as a more reliable version of what Hieronymus originally wrote.⁴⁸ What then can have been the purpose of changing the arrangement on which the consensus of the nobles had agreed at the earlier stage of the struggle? It must have been either that Meleager forced the change as part of the bargain,⁴⁹ or that the Perdiccans thought Craterus would for the present be more useful to them in this new position. Conclusive arguments on either side are lacking. Meleager had been attached to Craterus' command on the return journey from India,⁵⁰ and might conceivably have remained in touch with his ex-commander, now in Cilicia. Meleager was currently isolated and might welcome Craterus' presence at the court, in a position so imprecisely named as to allow maximum exploitation by a man popular with the troops. Meleager would naturally expect to benefit from any such arrangement. But this is speculation. So, unfortunately, is the chief argument on the other side, that Craterus was given the position by the Perdiccans. As we have seen, they had already used his name to emphasise their consensus: it would be reasonable to expect them to continue to exploit Craterus' popularity. In either case, however, we can readily assume that the Perdiccans did not intend Craterus ever to adopt this newly created post, for in the final settlement after Meleager's death they reverted to their original arrangement of making him share Europe with Antipater: and there is no doubt that the Perdiccans were responsible for that arrangement.⁵¹

⁴⁵ All details are in A. *succ.* 3.

⁴⁶ No one has ever doubted this, though his power-relationship with the others has been widely discussed: cf. Bengtson, *Die Strategie* i 63 ff.; Schwahn's version, *Klio* xxiv (1931) 326 ff., is the most realistic: that Antipater's position in the new arrangement was effectively no different from what it had been under Alexander.

⁴⁷ Cf. J. xiii 4.5: *regiae pecuniae custodia Cratero traditur*, which has occasionally been taken seriously (by, e.g. Bengtson, *Die Strategie*, i 75–6; Rosen, *AClass* x [1967] 101 ff.) though more usually (as the political context of the Babylon negotiations seems to make necessary) it is summarily dismissed. A mistranslation by Trogus, mistaking *βασιλείας* for *βασιλειον*, seems the likeliest explanation: cf. Ensslin, *RhM* lxxiv (1925) 296 ff., who prefers to posit a variation in Trogus' text of Hieronymus. Fontana, *Lotte*, 145 n. 40, gives a useful summary of what the *prostasia* has at various times been understood by modern scholars to mean, to which add Rosen, *AClass* x (1967) 101 ff.

⁴⁸ Dexippus, *FGrH* 100 F 8, 4. It is worth quoting

Dexippus' phrase, which he (wrongly) makes part of the general definitive settlement, for it has proved a stumbling-block for a generation of scholars: *τὴν δὲ κηδεμονίαν καὶ ὄση προστασία τῆς βασιλείας Κρατερός ἐπετρόπη, ὃ δὴ πρότιστον τιμῆς τέλος παρὰ Μακεδόσι*. Dexippus' explanation of *prostasia* as the highest Macedonian honour we can say at once is quite simply wrong. No scholar has ever been able to discover a high office called *prostasia* in Macedon before this (see Fontana, *Lotte* 134 ff., for the most recent search), and *prostasia* elsewhere is irrelevant. Either Dexippus or Photius must therefore have invented this explanation as an attempt to elucidate what he did not really understand (so Badian, *Studies* 266). If we reject Dexippus' explanation as evidence (as we must) we are left with the substance of Arrian's statement. As we have already noticed (n. 42 above) there is no reason for preferring Dexippus' time for the appointment to Arrian's.

⁴⁹ Cf. Vitucci, *Miscellanea Rostagni* (Turin, 1963) 65: 'ad opera degli antiperdicchiani'.

⁵⁰ A. *Anabasis* vi 17.3.

⁵¹ A. *succ.* 7.

Even this cannot serve as an argument over the intentions of the compromisers, for whether the Perdiccans or Meleager were responsible for Craterus' involvement, it is clear from the sequel that the Perdiccans made the compromise only to get control of the king and eventually to eliminate Meleager.⁵² What then does Craterus' *prostasia* amount to? The most recent discussion, though failing to differentiate the compromise from the definitive settlement, concludes that it was an honour without power.⁵³ Certainly it was without power. Craterus was not present; and whatever the ultimate intentions of Meleager (if Craterus' *prostasia* was his contribution to the compromise) it is clear that the Perdiccans never intended to allow it to become a position of power. On the other hand, it was clearly intended, in some sense, to be an honour, though Dexippus (or Photius) was exercising his imagination when he called it 'the highest Macedonian honour'. It was certainly—whichever side invented it—intended to have the effect of exploiting Craterus' prestige with the troops to create support for the compromise. Beyond this it is perhaps unwise to adventure, and the point has become academic in any case. An artificial position, created out of civil war for an absent general, to produce enthusiasm by propaganda, it has already had too much labour expended on it. It was, we may assume, never defined:⁵⁴ and it was never defined because the dominant party to the agreement never intended that it should become operative.

The remainder of the compromise is now comparatively straightforward. Perdicas' position was fully understood by Arrian and it creates no difficulty: he was to be 'chiliarch of the chiliarchy which Hephaestion had commanded'; and Arrian further defines this as 'supervisor of the whole kingdom'.⁵⁵ The command of Hephaestion's chiliarchy implied the Grand Viziership, and this has generally been recognised.⁵⁶ The Persian Grand Vizier was effectively the second-in-command of the whole Persian empire after the king: Perdicas, as Macedonian chiliarch, was second-in-command of the whole Macedonian empire, clearly including Europe. With an idiot king Perdicas was effectively in the position which Alexander had indicated for him, recognised as the most powerful single individual in the empire.⁵⁷

The last position in Arrian's list is Meleager's—more often ignored than explained by modern writers. Arrian calls him *ὑπαρχος Περδίκκου*. If we again take a natural untechnical interpretation, Meleager must be understood as Perdicas' second-in-command.⁵⁸ There is no difficulty in this. Perdicas was the outstanding individual at Babylon, and Meleager's attempt to oppose his personal predominance had failed: on that issue he could not expect Perdicas to negotiate. Meleager was negotiating from weakness, and his recognition as Perdicas' deputy was the most he could expect. Even this is surprising, but the sequel makes it clear that Meleager, like Craterus, was not intended by the Perdiccans to enjoy his sudden prominence for long.

III. THE DEFINITIVE SETTLEMENT

In the days after the compromise with Meleager Perdicas took his opportunities as they offered: a ritual purification of the phalanx for its mutiny destroyed the ringleaders of

⁵² Cf. C. x 8.22; 9.7 ff.

⁵³ Fontana, *Lotte* 140 ff. Badian, *Studies* 266, inclines to the drastic solution of altogether disbelieving in the *prostasia*: this seems unnecessary.

⁵⁴ Cf. Vitucci, *Miscellanea Rostagni* 65–6.

⁵⁵ A. succ. 3: Περδίκκων δὲ χιλιαρχεῖν χιλιαρχίας ἢς ἦρχεν Ἡφαιστίων (τὸ δὲ ἦν ἐπιτροπή τῆς ξυμπάσης βασιλείας). . . . D. xviii 2.4 calls him ἐπιμελητής.

⁵⁶ Cf. e.g. Schur, *RhM* lxxxiii (1934) 130 f.

⁵⁷ So Schwahn, *Klio* xxiv (1931) 320 ff.; restricted to Asia (unconvincingly) by Bengtson, *Die Strategie* i, 65 f.; followed by Rosen, *AClass* x (1967) 106 f.; Wehrli, *Antigone et Démétrios* (Geneva, 1969) 32.

⁵⁸ So De Sanctis, *SIFC* ix (1931–2) 8. Schwahn, *Klio* xxiv (1931) 310, adds unnecessary and undocumented precision by regarding Meleager as commander of the phalanx.

Meleager's supporters; Meleager's own murder followed swiftly after.⁵⁹ The Perdiccans had now attained the position of unchallenged predominance which Perdicas had been seeking for himself since Alexander's death: after Meleager's fate no one would dare to challenge the consensus. A period of intensive bargaining followed in which the most desirable satrapies were divided among those present at Babylon: the appointments were made in the name of the king, but Arrian's evidence of an atmosphere of mutual suspicion suggests that Perdicas was anxious to satisfy his most prominent supporters and remove them from contact with the king and his troops as soon as possible.⁶⁰

The time had also come to stop taking Craterus' name in vain. Now all had to be satisfied. Craterus could not be ignored: it was clear that in some way he had to be compensated for his absence. The last thing Perdicas can have wanted was Craterus at the court, and it is not surprising that we hear no more of the compromise arrangement. He will have found wide support for this view, for conflict between Perdicas and Craterus might easily have led to civil war, and this could have benefited nobody. Perdicas therefore reverted, in this respect, to the first proposal of the nobles' consensus, that Craterus should share command in Europe with Antipater. This might satisfy neither man, but Perdicas intended to offer assurances to Antipater.⁶¹ Craterus, absent, isolated among the nobles, and probably losing popularity among his veterans the longer he delayed their return home, would have little alternative to accepting his commission.

Thereafter the arrangement of the satrapies was a matter of balancing conflicting claims: the details of the negotiations are lost, but the principles of the settlements are traceable in the preserved lists.⁶² Those who were most important at Babylon received the most desirable satrapies: Ptolemy won Egypt; Leonnatus Hellespontine Phrygia. For Leonnatus this might conceivably have been regarded as adequate compensation for his loss of the central position which had been envisaged for him in the nobles' first consensus proposals; but with their abandoning their insistence on the priority of Roxane's baby, Leonnatus' position of joint-guardian had disappeared. After Perdicas' successful compromise with Meleager he had no useful central post for Leonnatus: Curtius, perhaps with some personal feeling, remarks, *nam et insociabile est regnum*.⁶³ Leonnatus acquired a crucial satrapy in exchange—which Perdicas could scarcely deny him—but his subsequent career shows his thwarted ambition, and his later disloyalty to Perdicas may have originated in this rebuff.⁶⁴

Others were less important. Those who were present required reward for their support, and Perdicas had no alternative to using the men he had. Lysimachus was given Thrace, Pithon Media; Menander, Alexander's satrap of Lydia, who was also present at Babylon,

⁵⁹ The order of events is that of A. *succ.* 4–5 and of C. x 9.7–21. Schachermeyr, *JOAI* xli (1954) 325 (= Griffith (ed.), *Alexander the Great* 121), followed by Badian, *HSPH* lxxii (1967) esp. 202 n. 62 prefers D. xviii 4.7–8, who places Meleager's death (and the 'purification' of the army) after the distribution of the satrapies and the rejection of the plans. He explains the variants of A. and C. by supposing Hieronymus to have mentioned the events twice, once in connexion with the 'purification' (before the distribution, as A. and C.), once where, according to Schachermeyr, it actually happened, after the distribution (as D.—but D. puts the 'purification' here also). D. is a mess chronologically, even though his information is from Hieronymus, and it seems unnecessary to see more than his own inaccuracy in the variation. Badian (*ibid.*) also argues that Alexander's plans were rejected *before*

the distribution of the satrapies (contrary to D.'s order of events) and that a settlement of the plans—whichever way—was a necessary preliminary to the distribution of the satrapies. But if we agree with Badian that the plans were negated to spike Craterus' guns, and add that nobody at Babylon seems to have had any enthusiasm for them, we may also think that nobody at Babylon wanted to risk losing a satrapal command by discussing the plans first. D.'s order of events therefore seems preferable here.

⁶⁰ A. *succ.* 5.

⁶¹ A. *succ.* 7; cf. Schwahn, *Klio* xxiv (1931) 328 ff.; on Antipater, see below, pp. 58–9.

⁶² A. *succ.* 5–7; D. xviii 3; C. x 10.1–4; Dexippus, *FGrH* 100 F 8; cf. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte* iv 2, 307 ff.

⁶³ C. x 9.1.

⁶⁴ See below, p. 60.

was confirmed;⁶⁵ in Cilicia Philotas, probably also present at Babylon, was confirmed.⁶⁶ Laomedon of Mitylene, one of Alexander's favoured Greeks, was given Syria; Eumenes, another Greek who had supported Perdiccas, was given the as yet unconquered Cappadocia and Paphlagonia: Leonnatus and Antigonus were to conquer it on his behalf.⁶⁷ Of the rest, the less important, inoffensive, or immovable were confirmed in their posts which they held under Alexander: the former categories will account for the eastern satrapies, the latter for the likes of Antigonus in Phrygia Major, Lycia and Pamphylia.

There could be no doubt that Perdiccas was pre-eminent. Arrian and Diodorus present the distribution of the satrapies as his; Diodorus mentions general agreement that all should obey the king and Perdiccas. But the appearance of consensus might yet prove illusory. The most obvious weakness of the settlement was Europe, and Perdiccas took immediate steps to gain Antipater's support. After his Pisidian campaign in 321, Diodorus says, in connexion with a marital (and hence political) crisis in Perdiccas' affairs, that 'previously Perdiccas had intended to collaborate with Antipater, and for this reason he had pressed his suit (for Antipater's daughter Nicaea) when his affairs were not yet firmly established. But when he had received the royal forces and charge of the kings, he changed his calculations.'⁶⁸

At what stage did Perdiccas first offer to marry Nicaea as a confirmation of his willingness to collaborate with Antipater? Diodorus' *πρότερον* is too vague to be any help. If we can establish when Perdiccas felt strong enough to change his mind, it gives us a *terminus post quem* for his change of mind. *Prima facie* Perdiccas received the royal forces as soon as the definitive settlement was agreed at Babylon. But he could not yet be said to have charge of the 'kings' (plural):⁶⁹ for Roxane was only in her sixth (or eighth) month when Alexander died in June,⁷⁰ and cannot have given birth (naturally) before July (though September is just as likely). We have noticed earlier how Perdiccas had insisted on the importance of Roxane's baby: Arrian says explicitly that when it was finally born (and proved to be male) the army assembly acclaimed the boy as king.⁷¹ The initiative presumably came from Perdiccas. For it would be entirely consonant with his earlier behaviour if he did not feel in full control until after the baby's birth and after its acclamation—which may have been some time afterwards.

This means that in practice we cannot be sure that Perdiccas had received charge of Roxane's child until after September (though as early as July is perfectly possible). His approach to Antipater was before this, and will therefore probably have been connected with the first negotiations at Babylon:⁷² for if Perdiccas wanted Antipater to take his

⁶⁵ Berve, *Das Alexanderreich* ii 255.

⁶⁶ Berve, *Das Alexanderreich* ii 397.

⁶⁷ Cf. Berve, *Das Alexanderreich* ii 231 (Laomedon); 156 (Eumenes); cf. Plut. *Eumenes* 3.2.

⁶⁸ D. xviii 23.2: ὁ δὲ Περδίκκας πρότερον μὲν ἦν κεκρικῶς κοινοπραγίαν Ἀντιπάτρῳ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν μνηστειάν ἐπεποίητο μήπω τῶν κατ' αὐτὸν πραγμάτων βεβαίως ἑστερωμένων ὡς δὲ παρέλαβε τὰς τε βασιλικὰς δυνάμεις καὶ τὴν τῶν βασιλέων προστασίαν, μετέπεισε τοῖς λογισμοῖς. *Prostasia* here is clearly not a technical term (despite the modern tradition which accepts and embroiders Beloch's interpretation of this as a 'usurpation' of Craterus' office: *GG* iv 1, 85). See conclusively, Fontana, *Lotte* 163 and n. 54; Badian, *Studies* 264 ff.

⁶⁹ It is often alleged that only Hieronymus, and he always, spoke of Philip and Roxane's child Alexander as 'the kings' (cf. e.g. Fontana, *Lotte* 127). The state of our sources makes this quite uncertain: cf. Badian, *Studies* 264.

⁷⁰ C. x 6.9 (sixth); J. xiii 2.5 (eighth). It is impossible to know which is correct.

⁷¹ A. *succ.* 9. What this meant legally is obscure; but it is clear that in practice Perdiccas set out to monopolise royalty, however obscure its claim. It would therefore be unwise (with Fontana, *Lotte* 124 ff.) to deny Roxane's son all royal title while Philip was alive (cf. Badian, *Studies* 264). Yet it is clear that documents from Egypt, Babylon, and the Greek world (except *OGIS* 4, *imit.*, which is an unofficial and undated later compilation) officially regarded Philip as king (evidence in Fontana, *loc. cit.*). We may therefore tentatively prefer Schwahn's solution (*Klio* xxiv [1931] 313)—if a legal solution was ever thought out—that Philip was probably intended to rule until Alexander's majority. So, explicitly, the Heidelberg *Epitome* (*FGrH* 155 F 1); but cf. Jacoby's commentary, *ad loc.*; also, Bauer, *Die Heidelberger Epitome* (Diss. Leipzig, 1914) 20–2.

⁷² So Fontana, *Lotte* 151 ff.

approach seriously—and he must have—it was clearly important that Antipater should immediately adopt a Perdiccan attitude towards Craterus. That is, he should accept the Perdiccan settlement which gave him Craterus as a colleague. This was the crux of the situation: Perdiccas' marriage proposal must have been intended to unite Antipater with him against Craterus, to ensure that Antipater would encompass the neutralisation—or elimination—of Perdiccas' chief potential opponent. We should therefore probably see Perdiccas' suit for Nicaea as an important part of his settlement.⁷³

Another essential part of the settlement is also recorded by Diodorus. Alexander's plans—a collection of projects of varying extravagance—were found in the palace archives after his death. Perdiccas had no intention of undertaking any of these projects, but since they originated with Alexander they could not be simply ignored and forgotten, for this would leave open the possibility of their being exploited at some future date by Perdiccas' opponents—particularly by Craterus, since Craterus seems to have been directly involved in some way. Entirely credibly Diodorus gives a picture of Perdiccas' putting the plans to the army and having them rejected:⁷⁴ in the context of the current uncertainty about the future, in particular about Craterus' intentions, it was essential that the supreme authority in the Macedonian state, the army assembly, should have the opportunity of killing off the plans by a positive decision which would have general recognition.⁷⁵

IV. ANTIPATER

News of Alexander's death seems to have reached Antipater and Athens at much the same time. At Athens preparations for a general revolt against Macedonian control, which had been secretly in progress for some time, were brought to a head: Antipater was rapidly faced by a hostile alliance in central Greece. The Lamian War had begun.⁷⁶

Shortly after this Antipater had news of the distribution of the satrapies at Babylon:⁷⁷ and if we have interpreted Perdiccas' intentions correctly, he will also, perhaps even before this, have received Perdiccas' request for Nicaea's hand. His immediate reaction was defensive. Naturally offended—as Perdiccas might have anticipated—that the royal prerogative had been manipulated to deprive him of his independence of command, he was not likely to look favourably on a proposal which implied his doing Perdiccas' dirty work for him. Moreover, the Lamian War was urgent, and Perdiccas was too far away and too deeply involved in court administration to be any help. Antipater therefore took no immediate action on Perdiccas' proposal.

Indeed, his reaction, though given edge by the urgency of the Greek rebellion, suggests hostility. For the first thing Diodorus records is his contacting the ambiguous Craterus in Cilicia with a request for aid. We may assume that this proposed alliance was intended to last beyond the immediate crisis in Greece.⁷⁸ Similarly Leonnatus in Hellespontine

⁷³ Antipater might also be expected to provide troops (J. xiii 6.6—for what it is worth!) and money (cf. D. xviii 12.2.).

⁷⁴ D. xviii 4.1-6.

⁷⁵ Tarn's arguments (*JHS* xli [1921] 1 ff.; *Alexander the Great* ii 378 ff.) and those of others, against the authenticity of the plans have now been satisfactorily disposed of by Schachermeyr, *JOAI* xli (1954) 118 ff. (= Griffith, *Alexander the Great* 322 ff.) and Badian, *HSPH* lxxii (1967) 183 ff., whose general interpretation I follow here.

⁷⁶ D. xviii 9.1 f.; 12.1; cf. Badian *JHS* lxxxi (1961) (= Griffith, *Alexander the Great* 206 ff.) 36 ff.

⁷⁷ D. xviii 12.1.

⁷⁸ D.'s chronology is doubtful. He presents Antipater's requests to Craterus and Leonnatus after discussing the origins of the Lamian War. He continues that, after learning (*πυθόμενος δὲ . . .*) of the Greek rising Antipater took certain military measures. D. does not intend this to be a chronological indication, for he makes Antipater's request simply for aid—*βοηθῆσαι*—which he clearly thought of in the context of the Lamian War—though it could have wider implications. Leonnatus could easily have reached Phrygia (cf. Plut. *Eumenes* 3.3) by early autumn 323 to receive Antipater's first request before he was shut up in Lamia. After the Babylon settlement there was no good reason for him, or for Eumenes, to remain at Babylon.

Phrygia was asked for aid—another man with a personal grievance against Perdiccas—and, taking his lead from Perdiccas' request for a marriage alliance, Antipater offered Leonnatus a daughter.⁷⁹ Ptolemy also, who had only accepted Perdiccas' supremacy at Babylon with reluctance, and who had been sufficiently powerful to gain Egypt in the distribution of the satrapies, a little later began negotiations with Antipater.⁸⁰

None of these negotiations produced results before Antipater had to take the field; and when he did the Greeks under Leosthenes were sufficiently powerful to be able to shut him up in Lamia, where he was besieged over the winter 323/2. Leonnatus was first to move, in early spring 322. We have already noticed how Leonnatus' ambitions had been frustrated at Babylon: even his satrapal command was circumscribed by Perdiccas' instructions that he should join with Antigonos in helping Eumenes to take control of Cappadocia and Paphlagonia.⁸¹ Antipater's initial request and offer of marriage was unattractive: Leonnatus saw little personal advancement in the arrangement and he remained inactive. By the time Antipater's second request for his aid had arrived—brought by Eumenes' personal enemy Hecataeus, the tyrant of Cardia—Antipater was besieged in Lamia. Leonnatus now began to take action. Antipater's proposal had not suddenly become more attractive to Leonnatus, but crossing to Europe had. For in the meanwhile Leonnatus had received letters from Alexander's sister Cleopatra, Olympias' daughter, which offered marriage if he would come to Pella—a fairly clear attempt by Olympias to spike Antipater's dynastic guns. To Leonnatus with his own royal pedigree this must have seemed a renewal of his chance of becoming part of the central government, which Perdiccas had first offered, then denied him, at Babylon. He accordingly crossed to Europe on the pretext of aiding Antipater.⁸²

Nothing came of Cleopatra's marriage proposals. We cannot be sure how seriously they were intended. If Olympias had anything to do with them, they were almost certainly part of her long-standing campaign against Antipater. In which case we may assume that after the Lamian War Cleopatra's marriage with the pliable Leonnatus would have taken place. The Lamian War was urgent for whoever was going to control Macedon after it, and whatever his arrangements for the future there is no difficulty in explaining Leonnatus' immediate entry into Thessaly. As the saviour of the Macedonian empire in Europe—whatever happened to Antipater—and Olympias' favourite he would have a good chance of establishing himself in Macedon after the Greeks were defeated. But it was not to be. His appearance with his army in Thessaly duly raised the siege of Lamia; but in his first conflict with the Greeks he was killed. Antipater was restored to full control.⁸³

In spring 322 Craterus also finally decided to cast in his lot with Antipater. His reasons will not have been wholly connected with the course of events in Europe. After Leonnatus' dereliction of his duty towards Eumenes, and when Antigonos' similar reluctance to involve himself in Cappadocia became apparent, Eumenes returned to the court, which was presumably still at Babylon.⁸⁴ Perdiccas, now that Roxane's boy had been born and acclaimed, cannot have been unwilling to leave Mesopotamia—though he must have been reluctant to press affairs in Europe to a conclusion, since Antipater's attitude was ambiguous, from his failure to respond to Perdiccas' request for Nicaea. Cappadocia gave him a good excuse for entering Asia Minor, and it had the added attraction that he would be able to challenge Craterus, who was still in Cilicia. Craterus must have been aware that his

⁷⁹ D. xviii 12.1 calls him Philotas by mistake. Cf. Seibert, *Historische Beiträge zu den dynastischen Verbindungen in hellenistischer Zeit* (*Historia Einzelschriften* x, Wiesbaden, 1967) 12.

⁸⁰ D. xviii 14.2.

⁸¹ Plut. *Eumenes* 3.2.

⁸² Plut. *Eumenes* 3.2-5; D. xviii 14.4-15.3.

Olympias is not explicitly mentioned; but her similar action in 321 (*A. succ.* 21; see below, p. 62f.) makes it likely. On Leonnatus' background, cf. Berve, *Das Alexanderreich* ii 232.

⁸³ D. xviii 14.5-15.5; *A. succ.* 9.

⁸⁴ Plut. *Eumenes* 3.6.

Macedonian veterans would be unlikely to oppose the chosen representative of the sons of Philip and Alexander in civil war: their loyalty to him, after nearly two years in Cilicia, was a wasting asset, and without it Craterus would be lost.⁸⁵ The veterans might very well, however, be persuaded to help Antipater. This would imply their long-awaited return home, and a war on behalf of the Macedonian hegemony against the rebellious Greeks—Greeks whom many of them may have felt personally responsible for conquering.⁸⁶ It is therefore difficult to believe that Perdikkas' approach to Cilicia on his way against Ariarathes in Cappadocia was not the final stimulus which drove Craterus into supporting Antipater.⁸⁷

While Perdikkas spent the summer conquering Cappadocia and settling it so that Eumenes' officials could control it without the presence of either the satrap—who remained with Perdikkas—or the royal army, Craterus joined Antipater in Thessaly and served under his command.⁸⁸ The union of their armies left the result of the war on land in little doubt: the decisive battle was fought at Crannon in September. At sea also Craterus' decision to join Antipater seems to have been decisive: for Clitus, the Macedonian admiral who won the naval battles of 322, had recently been associated with Craterus. Clitus had been one of the men sent home from Opis by Alexander under Craterus in 324,⁸⁹ from which time we know nothing more of him until 322.⁹⁰ Antipater did have a fleet in operation at the end of 323, the commander of which is not named; but since it comprised 110 triremes sent by Alexander to convey bullion, Clitus' fleet of 240 ships in 322 is probably different.⁹¹ The most satisfactory *prima facie* explanation is that Clitus had stayed with Craterus until Craterus decided to join Antipater, that he brought the ships with him, and that Craterus' decision was therefore largely responsible for the Macedonian naval successes.⁹² On 20th Boedromion⁹³ a Macedonian garrison entered Munychia; of the Greek allies only the Aetolian League refused to acknowledge the Macedonian victory. While a final campaign against the League was postponed until the next year, Antipater spent the greater part of the winter in reorganising the governments of the states which did accept defeat.⁹⁴

Immediate developments were dynastic. On Antipater's return to Macedon Craterus married Antipater's eldest daughter Phila, a match which Antipater may have promised, as he had to Leonnatus, during their negotiations for Craterus' collaboration.⁹⁵ This marriage cemented their alliance. Diodorus also mentions what seem to be the political terms of the marriage settlement: 'Antipater helped Craterus prepare for his return to Asia.'⁹⁶ The next event we hear about is Antipater's sending Nicaea (at last) to Perdikkas at Sardis⁹⁷—an act which Craterus must have known about and approved. Antipater's decision must therefore be interpreted in the light of his political arrangement with Craterus: Nicaea's marriage to Perdikkas, it is then clear, was envisaged as being consistent with Craterus' getting back to Asia. A peaceful approach to Perdikkas means that in the first instance Craterus placed his hopes in a peaceful agreement: he was now much stronger than he had been at the time of Babylon. The advantages for the Europeans of Nicaea's marriage with Perdikkas are clear: by being brought into a family connexion with Antipater

⁸⁵ Cf. Badian, *Studies* 265.

⁸⁶ 6,000 of them had crossed with Alexander: D. xviii 16.4.

⁸⁷ D. xviii 16.4. The connection is made by Schwahn, *Klio* xxiv (1931) 331–2, who, however, believes in (more or less) friendly negotiations: Perdikkas wanted Craterus to help Antipater in the war. Cf. Badian, *JHS* lxxxix (1961) 41.

⁸⁸ D. xviii 16.1–3; A. *succ.* 11; Plut. *Eumenes* 3.6–7 (Perdikkas). D. xviii 16.4–18.3 (Lamian War).

⁸⁹ J. xii 12.8. Cf. Schoch, *PW* s.v. 'Kleitios' no. 10.

⁹⁰ D. xviii 15.7–9.

⁹¹ D. xviii 12.2. So Walek, *RPh* xlvi (1924) 23 ff.

⁹² Cf. Beloch, *GG* iv 1, 73, n. 1.

⁹³ Plut. *Phocion* 28.

⁹⁴ D. xviii 18.4–6; 8. On the chronology, see APPENDIX 2.

⁹⁵ D. xviii 18.7; cf. Seibert, *Historische Beiträge* 12.

⁹⁶ D. xviii 18.7: τὴν εἰς Ἀσίαν ἐπίπλοον συγκατέσκευασεν.

⁹⁷ A. *succ.* 21; D. xviii 23.1. She arrived at Sardis in spring or early summer 321: cf. APPENDIX 2.

(and indirectly with Craterus) Perdiccas might peacefully be made to accept a more equitable arrangement (in Asia) for Craterus. But when Nicaea arrived, nearly two years had passed since Perdiccas' first proposal to Antipater, and circumstances had changed radically. Intended as an alliance against Craterus, its fulfilment now implied alliance with Craterus. Moreover Perdiccas had now controlled the central administration of the empire for nearly two years, he was accordingly much stronger and no longer had the same need for an alliance with Antipater. On the other hand, to refuse the alliance now offered, for which he had himself asked, was an insult which he could not expect Antipater—or, in the present circumstances, Craterus—to bear lightly.

To antagonise the Europeans would endanger the *prima facie* safety from the formal correctness of the dynasts' relations at the end of the Lamian War, which is made clear by the affair of Samos. Alexander's 'exiles' decree' had made untenable Athens' possession of Samos. Athens had delayed the evacuation, but the end of the Lamian War signalled the end of her resistance. Antipater *could* have made a decision, which the Athenians would have had no alternative to obeying; but he preferred to follow the correct procedure of referring a decision about Samos to the court and to avoid unnecessarily antagonising Perdiccas.⁹⁸ His action was formally correct: the new king (in practice, of course, Perdiccas) should decide on this broad issue. For Antipater, this procedure had the added advantage of letting him avoid incurring the inevitable Athenian odium from reasserting Alexander's orders.

The correctness and straightforwardness, however, seem to have been rather one-sided. During the Lamian War Demades had written to Perdiccas asking him to intervene in Greece. When the war was over, Perdiccas did not inform Antipater, who only found out by accident after Perdiccas' death when the letters were discovered.⁹⁹ The point is that Demades was a useful contact for Perdiccas: it seems reasonably clear that Perdiccas must have deliberately concealed their contacts in order to preserve his potential usefulness. Since Perdiccas had been in contact with Demades, he may also have been in touch with Aetolia. No contact as early as the Lamian War is recorded, but in spring 320 when war had broken out between Perdiccas and the coalition of Antipater, Craterus, and Ptolemy, a formal alliance between Perdiccas and Aetolia was in operation, which led the Aetolians into war with Polyperchon.¹⁰⁰ This could have been a product of the winter 321/0—indeed, the formal alliance cannot have been earlier. But its quick conclusion, its immediate effectiveness, and Perdiccas' concealed contacts with Demades, suggest that his contacts with the opponents of Antipater and Craterus in Greece might have been more widespread during and after the Lamian War—though in the nature of things secret and informal—than has hitherto appeared.

Another facet of this discreet search for support in Europe complicated affairs at Sardis when Nicaea arrived to marry Perdiccas. For the contemporaneous arrival of Cleopatra, sent by Olympias, presented a challenge to Nicaea and a dilemma to Perdiccas. Marriage with Alexander's sister was clearly consonant with Perdiccas' ambition to rule Alexander's empire, and Diodorus—no doubt reflecting Hieronymus—says explicitly that Perdiccas' own inclination was towards Cleopatra. He was supported in this by Eumenes, but his brother Alcetas persuaded him to take Nicaea.¹⁰¹

There is clearly more to all this than meets the eye, and the key figure is Eumenes. Eumenes, we are told explicitly by Arrian, favoured Cleopatra. We also know that Eumenes had been a confidant of Leonnatus when he had received a similar approach from Cleopatra in 323. On that occasion Eumenes had refused to trust Leonnatus, but had

⁹⁸ D. xviii 18.6; 9.

¹⁰⁰ D. xviii 38.

⁹⁹ D. xviii 48.2. On the time *cf.* Schubert, *Quellen zur Geschichte der Diadochenzeit* (Leipzig, 1914; repr. Aalen, 1964) 253.

¹⁰¹ D. xviii 23.1–3; A. *succ.* 21.

returned to Perdiccas and told him the whole story.¹⁰² It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Eumenes was in some way responsible for Cleopatra's arrival at Sardis, for, in addition to his connections already noticed, Eumenes negotiated with Cleopatra soon after Perdiccas' marriage to Nicaea, and again in 320;¹⁰³ his later representation of Olympias is well known. He also shared Olympias' long-standing hostility towards Antipater for personal reasons of his own, for Antipater was friendly with Eumenes' domestic enemy, Hecataeus, the tyrant of Cardia.¹⁰⁴ Eumenes will therefore have viewed with apprehension a marriage alliance between Antipater and Perdiccas, since his own influence with Perdiccas might be drowned in the sea of Perdiccas' domestic felicity. Similarly, Olympias' sole hope of regaining influence in Macedon lay in preventing Antipater from strengthening his position by allying closely with Perdiccas.

To emphasise the influence of Eumenes is not to deny Perdiccas a mind of his own. The symbolic advantages of a match with Cleopatra are not to be denied. But it is difficult to see how Perdiccas can have known in advance and approved of Cleopatra's impending arrival, for the scene at Sardis was highly inconvenient to him politically. Perdiccas would surely have preferred to make his decision about his marriage and future political alignment with less publicity and with less chance of offending the rejected. On a cool calculation, he could not afford to offend Antipater by putting off Nicaea, whom he himself had asked for: he cannot therefore have encouraged Cleopatra, whatever his long-term aspirations. What seems to have happened is that Eumenes (and perhaps Olympias) will have known about Antipater's decision about Nicaea, and have hastily decided to use Cleopatra in an attempt to prevent Perdiccas' alignment with Antipater (for them, potentially disastrous), which Alcetas favoured.¹⁰⁵ If Eumenes could persuade Perdiccas that his decision about Cleopatra had to be now or never—in order to avoid irreparably offending Olympias—he might bring him to ignore the short-term advantage of marriage with Nicaea in favour of the long-term prospect from marriage with Alexander's sister. For a time, if we are to believe Diodorus, Perdiccas wavered, and was tempted by Cleopatra. But Alcetas' sober advice prevailed: in the present circumstances in Macedon Cleopatra was a symbol without power. Her value, in the crucial short-term, against an insulted Antipater and an ambitious Craterus, was negligible. Perdiccas chose Nicaea.

The marriage, however, produced no more than a temporary respite. There is no sign that after it Perdiccas did anything to meet Craterus' aspirations, and this in itself will have predisposed the Europeans to take more forceful measures. But the efficient cause of the civil war which broke out at the end of the year was as yet unforeseen. Antigonus, who had refused to help Eumenes gain his satrapy, was threatened with legal proceedings—presumably for dereliction of duty.¹⁰⁶ He preferred not to submit to his trial, and fled to Europe where he joined Antipater and Craterus, who were terminating Aetolian resistance when he arrived. It was not long before Antigonus' long-time neighbour Menander, the satrap of Lydia, sent him news which aroused violent hostility to Perdiccas in Antipater and Craterus. Menander reported that Perdiccas had sent gifts to Cleopatra, who was still at Sardis, and had intimated that he intended to send Nicaea home.¹⁰⁷ If Menander's report was true, it implies that Eumenes' influence with Perdiccas had probably increased in the interval since Nicaea's marriage: the practical difficulty of accommodating Craterus satisfactorily—which the marriage implied—will perhaps have caused this reaction, and

¹⁰² Plut. *Eumenes* 3.5–6 (Leonnatus); A. *succ.* 21.

¹⁰³ A. *succ.* 26; 40.

¹⁰⁴ Plut. *Eumenes* 3.4.

¹⁰⁵ Alcetas continued to favour this course: he refused to serve under Eumenes in 320, no doubt partly for personal reasons, but explicitly because 'his Macedonians' (clearly including himself) 'were

ashamed to fight against Antipater and Craterus': Plut. *Eumenes* 5.2.

¹⁰⁶ D. xviii 23.4; A. *succ.* 20; cf. Fontana, *Lotte* 160 f. (though there is no evidence that Antigonus—or anyone else, for that matter—had been ordered and had refused to help in the Lamian War).

¹⁰⁷ D. xviii 25.3; A. *succ.* 26; on Menander, cf. Berve, *Das Alexanderreich* ii 255.

made Perdicas change his mind and now prefer (disastrously late) the course which Eumenes had initially recommended.¹⁰⁸ It may, however, be a misrepresentation of Perdicas' real intentions, for Hieronymus knew both Eumenes and Antigonos well, and either of them could have fed him their own version, which has survived in Arrian and Diodorus.¹⁰⁹ The truth we cannot tell, and it is ultimately unimportant: for Antipater and Craterus believed Menander's news. To them it was confirmation that their scheme to use Nicaea's marriage to secure Craterus' position in Asia had failed. Their contingency plan was war. The Aetolian War was immediately broken off uncompleted. Antipater and Craterus now formally confirmed the political terms of the settlement which they had agreed at the time of Craterus' marriage: Craterus should have *hegemonia* in Asia and Antipater in Europe. The technical terms for their offices are unimportant: Diodorus' '*hegemonia*' conveys clearly that the bargain implied the mutual recognition of their respective spheres of influence. Negotiations with Ptolemy were now concluded and an alliance formed, which presumably recognised Ptolemy's claim to Egypt. Preparations for invading Asia in spring 320 were put into effect at once. The first civil war had broken out: the Babylon settlement had lasted just two years.¹¹⁰

V. PERDICCAS

Perdicas' control of affairs declined steadily through 321. Not only did Cleopatra's arrival at Sardis terminate his friendly relations with Antipater, but his hitherto unchallenged control of the court was eroded from an unexpected quarter. Shortly after his marriage with Nicaea, Cynnane, another formidable Macedonian princess, arrived at the court and declared that her daughter, Adea, should marry king Philip. Cynnane was one of the daughters of Philip II, a half-sister of Alexander and Cleopatra; she had been married to Amyntas—for whom Philip II had initially been regent, but whom Alexander had murdered on his accession. Adea was a child of this union.¹¹¹ Perdicas realised the threat at once, for Cynnane was clearly trying to challenge his own control of the royal prerogative. The solution he chose, however, was a serious mistake, for he surprisingly underestimated his troops' regard for blood-relations of Philip and Alexander: Cynnane's murder by Alcetas provoked a riot among the troops, for it was unprovoked, and there was no obvious objection—apart from Perdicas' interest—to Adea's marrying Philip. Perdicas was forced to give way: on her marriage Adea changed her name to Eurydice.¹¹²

These domestic complications created difficulty enough. But also in 321 Perdicas lost control of Alexander's corpse. At Babylon Arrhidaeus had been given the task of preparing a suitable cortège to convey the dead king's body to Siwah: by spring or early summer 321 the cortège was ready to leave Babylon.¹¹³ But by spring 321 Ptolemy had a

¹⁰⁸ The resurgence of Eumenes' influence against that of Alcetas is reflected in Eumenes' being chosen by Perdicas to lead the opposition in Asia Minor to Antipater and Craterus. Alcetas was in less favour and perhaps in pique at Eumenes' success in persuading Perdicas to adopt an actively hostile policy towards the Europeans: he refused to serve under Eumenes against them (Plut. *Eumenes* 5.2; cf. 8.4 for further personal hostility). Alcetas' counsel was perhaps also discredited over the murder of Cynnane (A. *succ.* 22; see Section V) which he had encompassed and presumably recommended, and which produced a violently hostile reaction amongst Perdicas' troops.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. De Sanctis, *SIFC* ix (1931–2) 10–11, who

points out that Perdicas did not in fact marry Cleopatra, though after the break with Antipater there was nothing to stop him.

¹¹⁰ D. xviii 25.4–5. On the chronology, see APPENDIX 2. At some stage Ptolemy married a third daughter of Antipater, Eurydice (Paus. i 6.8). The date is uncertain, but a connection with this alliance is attractive: so Niese, *Geschichte der griechischen und makedonischen Staaten seit der Schlacht bei Chaeronea* (Gotha, 1893–1903) i 218.

¹¹¹ A. *succ.* 22–3; cf. Berve, *Das Alexanderreich* ii 229.

¹¹² A. *succ.* 22–3; D. xix 52.5; cf. Fontana, *Lotte* 160.

¹¹³ D. xviii 28.2.

far less friendly appearance than he had had when Perdiccas, in the midst of the political pressures at Babylon, had agreed that Alexander's well-known last wish for burial at Siwah should be carried out.¹¹⁴ In the meanwhile Ptolemy had firmly established himself by killing Cleomenes;¹¹⁵ without Perdiccas' permission he had annexed Cyrene;¹¹⁶ he had been in constant communication—though no formal agreement was concluded until the following winter—with Antipater.¹¹⁷ Perdiccas soon decided that he could not afford to allow Alexander's body and the prestige associated with it to fall into Ptolemy's control, and he decided to stop Arrhidaeus. Arrhidaeus however had already been in communication with Ptolemy, and Ptolemy met the cortège in Syria with an armed escort. Perdiccas' men were repulsed and Alexander entered Egypt where, for the present, he was buried at Memphis.¹¹⁸

This was greater provocation than Perdiccas could allow. He could not let Ptolemy escape with his *coup*, for with the prestige of Alexander's corpse in his possession Ptolemy was potentially Perdiccas' most dangerous opponent: if Perdiccas' central authority was to retain any general credibility Ptolemy must be punished. Ptolemy was not likely to make it easy for Perdiccas by imitating Antigonos and abandoning his (much stronger) satrapy. Accordingly, it is not surprising that when Antipater and Craterus approached Ptolemy in winter 321/0 for a formal alliance, after they had already decided on war against Perdiccas, they received an enthusiastic response.

In spring 320 Perdiccas invaded Egypt to punish Ptolemy and regain Alexander's corpse,¹¹⁹ while Eumenes protected the Hellespont on his behalf against Craterus and Antipater. Eumenes fought successfully against Craterus, who died in the battle, but Antipater slipped past with a large part of the army and made his way to Craterus' old base in Cilicia.¹²⁰ In the meanwhile Perdiccas' invasion of Egypt fared badly. After one particularly disastrous *contretemps* near Memphis, in which more than 2,000 men were drowned, a group of senior officers took advantage of the army's temporary disenchantment with Perdiccas' leadership and assassinated him.¹²¹

VI. PTOLEMY

Perdiccas' murder took place deep inside Ptolemy's satrapy: it is unlikely that Ptolemy was not implicated. At an early stage of the invasion both Diodorus and Arrian show that Perdiccas was suffering defections to Ptolemy, even among his officers, which seems in itself evidence for an effective Ptolemaic fifth column in Perdiccas' ranks.¹²² Furthermore, Ptolemy clearly went out of his way to cultivate popularity among Perdiccas' rank and file. After the Perdiccan disaster near Memphis, before Perdiccas' murder, Ptolemy burned the bodies which he could recover and returned the bones to Perdiccas' camp, an act of *pietas* which found immediate favour and which was reflected in the welcome which Ptolemy received when he entered the Perdiccan camp after Perdiccas' death.¹²³

Perhaps conclusive for Ptolemy's discreet involvement, however, is his relationship with the assassins. Far from continuing the Perdiccan crusade against Ptolemy's separatism after Perdiccas' death, they invited Ptolemy to speak to the Perdiccan army; and after a favourable reception he provided supplies.¹²⁴ The pressing problem was now the control of the court. Had Pithon, the leader of the assassins, aspirations to succeed Perdiccas

¹¹⁴ On this and what follows, see Badian, *HSPH* lxxii (1967) 185 ff.

¹¹⁵ Paus. i 6.3.

¹¹⁶ D. xviii 19–21; A. *succ.* 16–19.

¹¹⁷ D. xviii 14.2; *cf.* 25.4.

¹¹⁸ Detailed discussion in Badian, *HSPH* lxxii (1967) 185 ff.

¹¹⁹ A. *succ. fr.* 10, 1.

¹²⁰ D. xviii 29–33; A. *succ.* 26–7; Plut. *Eumenes* 5–7.

¹²¹ D. xviii 33–36.5; A. *succ.* 28.

¹²² D. xviii 33.2 f.; A. *succ.* 28.

¹²³ D. xviii 36.1–2; A. *succ.* 29.

¹²⁴ D. xviii 36.6; *cf.* Schubert, *Quellen zur Geschichte der Diadochenzeit* 194.

himself? There are some indications that he had had high ambitions at a much earlier stage. After his appointment to Media at Babylon, Perdiccas had given him the task of quelling a rebellion of Greek settlers in the upper satrapies. In the course of this operation Pithon had been tempted to negotiate with the settlers on his own behalf, but had been prevented by the loyalty of his troops to the central government. The Greek rebellion had then been brutally quelled.¹²⁵ That such a man should lead a conspiracy against Perdiccas is quite comprehensible: that he did so without looking to his own advantage is unthinkable.

Ptolemy must clearly have been invited to address the Perdiccan army by the conspirators, a fact which in itself probably implies some previous contact. The result of the meeting suggests that he had actually bargained with Pithon. Diodorus says that Ptolemy received an enthusiastic welcome and was in a position to assume control of the court as a result of the favour of the assembly for him. But he made no attempt to do so. Instead he used his influence to gain the control of the central government for Pithon and Arrhidaeus, to whom he owed a debt of gratitude. Arrian adds the information that their appointment was temporary.¹²⁶ Ptolemy's own reluctance to take over the central government is comprehensible enough: it would have implied hostility towards his allies Antipater and Craterus (Craterus' death was not yet known)¹²⁷ if he had taken his duties seriously; and if he had not, it might have been less easy for him to retain the kind of popularity which he seems to have currently possessed.

He need not, of course, have interfered at all. He could have allowed the assassins to destroy themselves in mutual jealousy and recrimination before quietly assuming responsibility for the rank and file. But it is easy enough to see (in outline) Ptolemy's motives for reaching an agreement with Pithon and the terms on which he would insist. Perdiccas, despite setbacks, had nearly reached Memphis, where Alexander was buried: he had been discouraged, but not yet defeated. His invasion was a serious matter for Ptolemy, quite serious enough for Ptolemy to begin negotiations with Pithon for Perdiccas' elimination. The bargain will therefore have been, on Pithon's side, Perdiccas' murder and an undertaking for the future to leave Ptolemy unmolested in Egypt, on Ptolemy's side the use of his influence to secure the command for Pithon, and a safe-conduct out of Egypt for the Perdiccans. This must be what Diodorus means when he mentions Ptolemy's debt of gratitude to Pithon. It was apparently similar in kind to his debt to Arrhidaeus, who had brought him Alexander's body. Whether Arrhidaeus' sharing the command with Pithon was part of the original bargain cannot be discovered. It may have been a last minute insertion by Ptolemy; but since the sequel does not show Pithon and Arrhidaeus disagreeing, Pithon may have agreed to this originally. The fact that the Memphis arrangement was intended to be temporary we can attribute to Ptolemy's reluctance to provoke Antipater and Craterus by seeming to make arrangements without consulting them. We may easily believe that privately Ptolemy did not much care what happened to the central government after its withdrawal from Egypt as long as it agreed to leave him in peace: Pithon and Arrhidaeus might make what they could of their temporary appointment.

Immediate difficulties were thus resolved. The impression that these activities made on the troops must have been of a renewal of the nobles' consensus of Babylon. There is no reason, politically, why they should have approved of Perdiccas' murder; but they were presented with a *fait accompli*—with Ptolemy's army ready to reinforce the point if they

¹²⁵ D. xviii 7.

¹²⁶ D. xviii 36.6–7; A. *succ.* 30.

¹²⁷ D. xviii 33.1 mentions Perdiccas' getting news of 'Eumenes' victory' before he reached the Nile; but in 37.1 he puts the news of Eumenes' victory against Craterus and Neoptolemus after Perdiccas' death, and he related it after the settlement. Schubert, *Quellen* 196, attributes the variations to different

sources, but this is not Diodorus' method (*cf.* Fontana, *Lotte* 259 ff.). We are therefore driven to accepting Droysen's suggestion (*Gesch. d. Hell.* ii 127) that 33.1 must refer to Eumenes' earlier success against Neoptolemus (D. xviii 29.4 f., *cf.* Plut. *Eumenes* 5). About ten days elapsed between the two battles (Plut. *Eumenes* 8.1).

quibbled. This appearance of consensus among the nobles, and Ptolemy's influential approval of Perdiccas's murder will account for the troops' reception of the news of Eumenes' success in killing Craterus and Neoptolemus: Eumenes and fifty of his followers, including Perdiccas' brother Alcetas, were at once condemned to death; the same feeling resulted in Perdiccas' closest associates and his sister Atalante being lynched.¹²⁸ The troops' reaction must have been stimulated by the generals' anti-Perdiccan consensus. Perdiccas had employed the Greek Eumenes: as a result Eumenes had killed the Macedonians Craterus and Neoptolemus. Eumenes could therefore be represented as a Greek rebel. This representation might have been particularly effective since both Pithon (in the upper satrapies) and Antipater and Craterus (in Greece) had recently struggled to put down Greek rebels. If this picture of Eumenes could be established, Perdiccas and all Perdiccans were clearly branded as supporters of Greek rebels, hence hostile to the true imperial interests of the Macedonian state, and deserving wholesale condemnation by the current representatives of the Macedonian people in arms.

VII. TRIPARADEISOS

Pithon and Arrhidaeus at once marched their royal army out of Egypt and proceeded to Triparadeisos in Upper Syria.¹²⁹ That they now hoped to make their temporary appointment permanent is not attested, but it can perhaps be assumed that they would take all possible advantage from their situation. The rapid course of events, however, makes speculation valueless. On the army's arrival at Triparadeisos king Philip's wife Eurydice began to work up the ex-Perdiccan troops—who might be expected to support her since they had forced Perdiccas to allow her marriage—against Pithon and Arrhidaeus. The regents took the threat seriously enough to abandon any pretensions of their own and to take refuge in the consensus which had secured their appointment. Antipater was in the vicinity, though he had not yet reached Triparadeisos with his army. Before his arrival they abdicated their responsibilities and secured the troops' agreement for Antipater's appointment to the supreme position as Perdiccas' successor as controller of the court and of the central government.¹³⁰

For a short time consensus seemed to have had the desired effect. But when Antipater reached Triparadeisos disaffection was again rampant in the ex-Perdiccan ranks. Eurydice had continued her agitation, and was now—if not before—supported by her secretary Asclepiodorus and Perdiccas' brother-in-law Attalus. Attalus had left Egypt after the murder of his wife Atalante with the Perdiccan fleet and had taken refuge in Tyre, where he assumed the custody of 800 talents. After his arrival Tyre became a refuge centre for Perdiccan survivors and sympathisers.¹³¹ When Antipater arrived at Triparadeisos he was immediately involved in a riot for arrears of pay, which Perdiccas and his successors had not provided. Antipater promised the money, but was unable at once to find sufficient cash in the treasury of the central government.¹³²

The soldiers' grievance was real enough: Antipater acknowledged that. Its deepest

¹²⁸ D. xviii 37–1–2.

¹²⁹ D. xviii 39.1.

¹³⁰ D. xviii 39.2; cf. A. succ. 31–2.

¹³¹ A. succ. 32–3 (agitation); D. xviii 37.3–4 (Attalus and Tyre). Kaerst, PW s.v. 'Attalos' nos. 5 and 7, denies the identification of the Attalus of Triparadeisos with Perdiccas' brother-in-law. He is followed by Berve, *Das Alexanderreich* ii 95. But A. succ. 39 with D. xviii 41.7 makes the identification clear: so Tarn, *CAH* vi 469.

¹³² A. succ. 32. The text reads: *καὶ ὁ στρατὸς*

αἰτεῖ τὰ παρὰ Ἀλεξάνδρον ὑποσχεθέντα αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τῇ συστρατεῖα χρήματα. . . . As it stands this must be wrong. Alexander had been dead for three years, and 'the expedition' in question at Triparadeisos can only be Perdiccas' Egyptian expedition. Photius may have accidentally substituted 'Alexander' for 'Perdiccas'; but it is perhaps best to assume that Arrian had something about recovering Alexander's body (cf. A. succ. fr. 10, 1) or preserving Alexander's empire, which Photius has garbled in abbreviating. D. does not mention this issue.

danger lay in its exploitation by Eurydice and the Perdiccans who (ironically for Antipater) were now able to exploit against Antipater the fact that Perdiccas' death had prevented his paying his troops: the money at Tyre which they now controlled (and presumably similar treasuries elsewhere) had no doubt been intended for this purpose when the expedition returned to Syria. Antipater was temporarily embarrassed: Perdiccas' army had only recently acknowledged him as Perdiccas' successor, yet he could not reward them. Antipater's presence at an army meeting addressed by Eurydice and Attalus was provocative, and he only escaped lynching by the intervention of Antigonus and Seleucus who, presumably stressing the consensus line and promising rapid payment, managed to produce calm. Antipater returned to his own camp which he had carefully kept apart from the Perdiccan. After Eurydice was silenced and Attalus had managed to escape, the Perdiccan agitation collapsed.¹³³ When the Macedonian officers met soon afterwards in Antipater's camp they showed no reluctance to re-affirm their support for his pre-eminence. No single individual, after the deaths of Craterus and Perdiccas, and after Ptolemy's opting out of the struggle, could hope to challenge Antipater. Consensus could therefore be re-affirmed.¹³⁴

Consensus could govern attitudes only as long as it seemed advantageous. The officers had shown Antipater their loyalty: Antipater had now to show that he appreciated it. Yet Antipater showed no enthusiasm for ruling the whole empire as Perdiccas' successor. He had begun the war solely because he felt threatened in Macedon, and had agreed at the outset that success would provide Asia for Craterus, who in turn had acknowledged Antipater's right to rule Europe. Ptolemy, we may assume, was also party to the same agreement, and both men were probably bound to Antipater by marriage. If the agreement had become effective, it ruled out the possibility of any one man's claiming to rule as Alexander's (or rather, Perdiccas') successor. Craterus' death shattered this scheme. The Perdiccan riots had thrust Antipater into an invidiously prominent position, yet his ambition seems not to have expanded to match his success. His position was made the more difficult by pressure from at least two sides: the officers needed reward for their loyalty, yet he could not afford to allow any of them to become powerful enough to become, in effect, a second Perdiccas, for this would present a threat to his control of Europe, and make his whole war-effort useless. On the other hand, the Macedonian rank and file, who had acknowledged his overall supremacy, would at once be suspicious of any attempt to break up their empire: their acknowledgement of Antipater, it might seem, laid on him the duty of keeping the empire together.

Antipater, it transpired, was not prepared to compromise his own inclinations for returning to Macedon; nor—hardly surprising for a man in his late seventies—had he any wish to pursue the war with Eumenes and the remaining Perdiccans himself. The man who could most obviously fill the role of Craterus' successor was Antigonus, the only important member of the anti-Perdiccan alliance not to have a clear prospect from its success. Antigonus had been prominent: active in Cyprus during Perdiccas' invasion of

¹³³ A. succ. 32–3; 39; cf. D. xviii 39.4.

¹³⁴ A. succ. 33: *καὶ οἱ ἵππαρχοὶ Ἀντιπάτρον καλοῦντος πρὸς αὐτὸν ἦγον, καὶ μόλις τῆς στάσεως πεπαισμένης Ἀντιπάτρον πάλιν, ὡς καὶ πρόσθεν, ἄρχειν εἶλοντο.* This cannot be correct in any legally binding sense. If the rioting troops had deposed Antipater—which is not attested—a vote of the officers would not be sufficient in the prevailing delicate circumstances to reverse their decision. I have therefore interpreted the phrase as a vote of confidence. However, the trouble may be more deep-seated. For instance, if Arrian had something like 'the hipparchs met and (discussed matters; they then put their decision to the

troops who) chose Antipater as before', the bracketed portion represents what Photius would have had to omit to produce our text. Photius had no abiding interest in Macedonian *Staatsrecht*, and since our hypothetical second meeting (of troops) will simply have confirmed the decision of the earlier one of the hipparchs, it might seem quite unimportant to him: fortunately—as we would expect—he has the end result accurate enough. If Photius has done something like this—whether deliberately or accidentally—we may assume that Antipater had been deposed by the rioters.

Egypt,¹³⁵ he had come to Triparadeisos in time to calm the Perdiccans and to help save Antipater's life in the riots.¹³⁶ He was marked out for advancement, and Antipater's settlement recognised this. His long-standing command as satrap in Phrygia Major, Lycia and Pamphylia was confirmed, but he was also, at his own request, given the command against Eumenes:¹³⁷ if Antipater had appointed anyone other than Antigonos, Antigonos might have felt justified resentment. These posts could scarcely be denied him. What does seem gratuitous, however, is the control of the court which Antigonos now received. Certainly there is no indication that this was intended to last longer than the war against Eumenes: it is explicitly attached to the war command by the epitome of Arrian, together with the stipulation that Antigonos' army should be Perdikkas'.¹³⁸ It is nevertheless surprising that Antipater should abandon, even temporarily, his control of the court which any potential rival might exploit. It plainly suggests that he felt that he had created sufficient other safeguards against such exploitation by Antigonos.

What these were is not difficult to see. First, Antipater attached his son Cassander to Antigonos' staff as cavalry chiliarch, an appointment which Diodorus explicitly says—clearly reflecting Hieronymus—was designed as a safeguard.¹³⁹ Secondly, Antigonos was not recognised as having a general command over Asia, such as had been envisaged for Craterus, apart from the war with Eumenes; and even here territorial expansion was beyond Antigonos' legal reach, for he was fighting ostensibly to impose a new satrap, Nicanor, in Eumenes' old satrapy.¹⁴⁰ Thirdly, apart from the immediate needs of the

¹³⁵ A. *succ.* 30. Cyprus was an important sector of the war against Perdikkas, and Antigonos' contribution to the allied war effort was correspondingly great. In spring 320, while Perdikkas was in Cilicia *en route* for Egypt (A. *succ.* fr. 10.2), he heard that four of the Cypriot kings—of Salamis, Soli, Paphos and Amathus—had allied with Ptolemy (A. *succ.* fr. 10.6), and were besieging Marion. Moser, *Untersuchungen über die Politik Ptolemaeos I in Griechenland (323–285 a.Chr.n.)* (Diss. Leipzig, 1914) 13 ff., argues that a less formal friendship between Ptolemy and the Cypriots had existed since 323, and that the Cypriots are the *reges finitimos* of J. xiii 6.19. This is possible, though if so Perdikkas did not consider it hostile to him. Perdikkas now sent Aristonous with a fleet and a force of mercenaries and cavalry to defend Marion. We do not know the result. On the allied side, as well as Antigonos, Clitus, with the allied fleet, may have been involved (*OGIS* 4, line 15, but see the arguments of Lenschau [*ap.* Dittenberger's n. 5] for a time after Triparadeisos). Ptolemy's formal alliance with the Cypriot kings was clearly made after it became clear that Perdikkas intended to attack him, and it fits into the same context as his alliance with Antipater and Craterus, therefore in winter 321/0. Antigonos (and Clitus) cannot have had anything to do with this; but Antigonos' work in the island was clearly important and an integral part of the allied war effort against Perdikkas.

¹³⁶ A. *succ.* 33.

¹³⁷ A. *succ.* 37; 38; D. xviii 39.6–7.

¹³⁸ A. *succ.* 38: *καὶ τότε τοὺς βασιλέας φρουρεῖν τε καὶ θεραπεύειν προστάξας τὸν πόλεμον ἅμα τὸν πρὸς Ἐὐμένη διαπολεμῆσαι αὐτῶ ἀιρονμένῳ ἐπέτρεπεν.* The court is not mentioned by D., but this may easily be his own omission. I can find no indication in the

sources that Antigonos was given any formal command in addition to his satrapy beyond what was necessary for the war with Eumenes. Both D. and A. explicitly connect his army command with this war: neither say that he was 'the general of the royal army in Asia' (so Tarn, *CAH* vi 470; cf. Bengtson, *Die Strategie* i 96 ff.). Only D. mentions the 'royal army': A. calls it Perdikkas'. What D.'s phrase must mean is 'the army to which the court was attached' (he does not otherwise mention Antigonos' connexion with the court), and parallels with Assyrian and Persian formations are out of place here: there was no official Macedonian 'royal army of Asia', except by the accident of there being Macedonian troops and the Macedonian king in Asia. Bengtson's explanation, *op. cit.*, 100, of Philip's presence with Antigonos must therefore be incorrect, that Philip was attached to Antigonos' (and earlier to Perdikkas') army because, even if fictitiously, he commanded 'the royal army'. Rather, the army was made royal by his presence. Fontana, *Lotte* 175 ff., following Schachermeyr, *Klio* xviii (1925) 451 ff., thinks Antipater now intended permanently to give up the court to Antigonos. This is not in the epitome of Arrian, which only connects Antigonos' control of the court with the war with Eumenes. Rightly on this, Bengtson, *op. cit.*, 99–100.

¹³⁹ D. xviii 39.7; A. *succ.* 38.

¹⁴⁰ A. *succ.* 37. The commonness of the name Nicanor (9 known under Alexander alone; Berve, *Das Alexanderreich* ii nos. 553–61) makes identification hazardous. Antipater had a son Nicanor (Berve, no. 553) who might conceivably have been thus attached to Antigonos, as was Cassander. Another possibility is Nicanor of Stageira (Berve, no. 557),

war, Antigonus could expect little support for private long-term plans from the other satraps. Particularly in Asia Minor, Antipater was careful to choose men who were likely to remain loyal to him.

Enough can be listed to establish the principle. To Hellespontine Phrygia, vacant since Leonnatus' death, Antipater appointed Arrhidaeus, the anti-Perdiccan who had taken Alexander's corpse to Egypt, and at Triparadeisos had, with his fellow regent Pithon, abdicated in Antipater's interest: he would have no sympathy with Eumenes, and would be unlikely to encourage Antigonus.¹⁴¹ Lydia is similar. Antigonus' friend Menander was replaced by Clitus, who after joining Antipater with Craterus in 322 had a consistent record of loyalty to Antipater as admiral in the Lamian War and in the war against Perdiccas. Menander joined Antigonus.¹⁴² Caria is less certain: Antipater reappointed Asander, probably a nephew of Parmenio's, who had like Antigonus been forced out of his post by Perdiccas. In 314 Asander was actively hostile to Antigonus and friendly to Ptolemy, and his attitude might have originated in 320.¹⁴³ Cilicia is still more difficult, although it is clear that Antipater's appointee Philoxenus—a man famous only for his obscurity—owed his position solely to Antipater. Since he had been appointed initially by Perdiccas shortly before his invasion of Egypt, it is odd to find Antipater confirming him.¹⁴⁴ The explanation is not in the sources; but it may be that on Antipater's arrival in Cilicia Philoxenus yielded quietly to *force majeure*. Since he was not a prominent man, his confirmation in Cilicia would present no threat to Antipater. Asia Minor could thus be considered loyal to Antipater—or at least hostile to the individual ambitions of others. The east was far less important to Antipater, and apart from some obvious rewards—Pithon's confirmation in Media, for instance, Seleucus' appointment to Babylonia, and that of Antigeneis, also a conspirator against Perdiccas, to Susiana¹⁴⁵—there is no trace of massive and deliberate changes. In Egypt Ptolemy was naturally confirmed. The east, in effect, could look after itself.¹⁴⁶

Returning to Antigonus, we can see that Antipater might well feel that Antigonus' real power was sufficiently circumscribed to present little threat to his own position in Macedonia. Antigonus' army was that of Perdiccas; but Perdiccas' army, after Attalus' agitation, might be reluctant to fight against Eumenes and the remaining Perdiccans—including Attalus, of course—unless it was convinced that it had the backing of the central government. Antipater seems to have felt that the safest way that this could be achieved, without Antipater himself undertaking the war, was for the court to be attached to Antigonus' headquarters. This had its dangers if Antigonus proved unscrupulous in his ambitions, but the war against the Perdiccans was a serious business, and to Antipater at Triparadeisos this seemed a smaller risk than the alternative of giving Antigonus part of his own loyal army: let Antigonus have the job of controlling the formidable Eurydice. Antigonus' task of imposing discipline on

who had brought Alexander's 'Olympic proclamation' to Greece in 324; but if so he will not have been long in Cappadocia, for Cassander appointed him commandant of the garrison in Munchia when Antipater died in 319 (Plut. *Phocion* 31.1). However, the Cappadocian satrap might be neither of these men: so Beloch, *GG* iv 1, 117.

¹⁴¹ Cf. Kaerst, PW s.v. 'Arrhidaios', no. 5.

¹⁴² Menander: Berve, *Das Alexanderreich* ii 255, wrongly says M. was dead by 321. Tarn, *CAH* vi 470, has this right, but he invents M.'s appointment as Antigonus' second-in-command. On M.'s later career, cf. Geyer, PW s.v. 'Menandros' no. 5. Clitus: cf. Schoch, PW s.v. 'Kleitios' no. 10. J. xiii 6.16 has C. wrongly on Perdiccas' side in the invasion of Egypt: see Beloch, *GG* iv 1, 87, n. 3.

¹⁴³ Cf. Kaerst, PW s.v. 'Asandros' no. 3.

¹⁴⁴ D. xviii 39.6; cf. A. *succ. fr.* 10.2: *ἐνα τῶν ἀφανῶν Μακεδόνων*. Berve, *Das Alexanderreich* ii 390, following Wilcken, correctly identifies him with the *Φιλόξενός τις Μακεδών* of [Arist.] *Oecon.* ii 31, p. 1351, who became satrap of Caria after Ada's death.

¹⁴⁵ A. *succ.* 35; D. xviii 39.6. Nepos, *Eumenes* 5.1, is alone in making Seleucus a leading conspirator; yet although this is widely accepted (e.g. Tarn, *CAH* vi 469) it is not confirmed by A. and D., who at Triparadeisos both explicitly connect Antigeneis' appointment, which they mention immediately after Seleucus', with the murder. Hieronymus may therefore not have connected Seleucus with it.

¹⁴⁶ Cf. list and discussion in Beloch, *GG* iv 2, 314 ff.

the Perdican army was lightened by 3,000 of the most tumultuous soldiers being detached for bullion escort duty from Susiana.¹⁴⁷ But the loyalty of the remaining troops to Antigonos, as a representative of the central government, was to be chiefly secured by the constant presence of the court. The reason for its presence with Antigonos was clearly practical, as Arrian suggests, not ideological: there is no reason for thinking that it was intended to last beyond the termination of the war with Eumenes.

VIII. EPILOGUE

The division of the empire at Triparadeisos, and the character and limited ambition of the man who imposed it, made almost inevitable the ultimate break-up of Alexander's empire. While Perdikkas' supremacy had lasted, the custody of the court had been associated solely with his attempt to impose central government on all parts of the empire. Once Antipater was supreme, however, the custody of the court became associated with Macedonian particularism, for Antipater used it solely to make secure his own government in Europe. And this was not all, for Ptolemy, by refusing to take control of the court after Perdikkas' murder implicitly advertised his own separatist ambitions: their legitimacy was confirmed by Antipater at Triparadeisos.

As long as Antipater lived there was little hope for any remaining unifiers. When he returned to Europe he took the court with him. Cassander had not taken long to awaken his suspicions of Antigonos, and had persuaded him to remove the court from Antigonos' control. Cassander's motives were probably not disinterested: Antipater was an old man, and Cassander's own prospect of succeeding him—and of staking his claim to a part or the whole of the empire—depended on Antipater's having control of the court when he died.¹⁴⁸ Arrian records a bargain some months after Triparadeisos and shortly before Antipater returned to Europe, whereby Antipater regained the court but gave Antigonos a large number of his own troops in exchange. Arrian records the bare facts. But the argument, no doubt, ran that these troops would provide the ex-Perdikkans in Antigonos' army with as much evidence of the central government's commitment to the war as the presence of the court: the exchange would not endanger the efficiency of the war effort.¹⁴⁹

The bargain might nevertheless have seemed one-sided to Antigonos, and Photius' version of Arrian may not have recorded all the details. In spring 319 Diodorus calls Antigonos *strategos* of Asia, and he says that this title had been given him by Antipater. Since he repeats a version of the phrase later it seems likely that he has represented Hieronymus accurately.¹⁵⁰ Whatever the exact title, the office has a close resemblance to the *hegemonia* of Asia which Craterus was to have had, had he lived. Since we know that such a post was not given to Antigonos at Triparadeisos, the most reasonable time for the change seems to be when he gave up the court, when Antipater was about to leave Asia, and when Antigonos might reasonably have asked for more than troops in return. This re-arrangement effectively acknowledged Antigonos as Craterus' successor, and we may perhaps best place here the marriage of Antigonos' son Demetrius with Antipater's daughter Phila, Craterus' widow. The date of the marriage is not attested.¹⁵¹ But it would fit this

¹⁴⁷ A. *succ.* 38.

¹⁴⁸ Cf. Schachermeyr, *Klio* xviii (1925) 456.

¹⁴⁹ A. *succ.* 43–4. D., who does not mention Antigonos' brief control of the court, records *tout court* that Antipater brought the kings back to Europe to their homeland (xviii 39.7). The number of troops involved in the exchange is uncertain: A. says 8,500 infantry and an equal number (*ἰσους*) of companion cavalry. The cavalry figure is nonsense, for even after assimilating Eumenes' army Antigonos had only 7,000 cavalry (D. xviii 45.1). The

important fact, however, is that the total number of troops was large enough to indicate a firm commitment.

¹⁵⁰ D. xviii 40.1; 50.1.

¹⁵¹ Plut. *Demetrius* 14; D. xix 59.3–6. A son of this marriage, Antigonos Gonatas, died in 240/39 aged 80: [Lucian] *Macrob.* 11 (but cf. Eusebius, i 237, who makes him an impossible 83!). Beloch, *GG* iv 2, 134–5, argues for 321/0 (i.e. at this time, since he places Triparadeisos in 321); so also Seibert, *Beiträge* 13.

bargain admirably: for if Antipater's only ultimate safeguard with Craterus had been Phila's marriage, it was no more than suitable that Craterus' successor should be bound in the same way.

This re-arrangement of powers and titles made an ultimate reunion of the empire even less likely. For although the court still existed, and was still acknowledged by the troops—who may have been unaware that fundamental changes in the structure and ethos of their government had been made at Triparadeisos, since Antipater *prima facie* still claimed supremacy over the whole empire—it was now more than ever merely a weapon in the hands, or a word in the mouths, of the nobles. The three large blocks of territory which eventually crystallised into the three major hellenistic monarchies were now each held by its possessor, each with an indisputably legal claim. For the first time no serious claim to a right of general interference outside his own territory was made by any of the three possessors. For the first time Alexander's empire ceased to have more than a nominal head. This glimpse of the future did not last long: its first phase ended with Antipater's death in 319. All claims to ultimate sovereignty over the whole empire of Alexander were far from being abandoned yet. But the precedent had been set: once powerful and influential men were prepared to struggle for and be satisfied with a part of the whole, the prospect of ultimate reunification was negligible.

APPENDIX I: CURTIUS' ACCOUNT OF EVENTS AT BABYLON

Source criticism of events after Alexander's death is chiefly concerned with establishing the relationship of our extant sources to the work of Hieronymus of Cardia. Hieronymus was a participant in many of the activities of the *diadochi*, a close associate of Eumenes and later of Antigonos, and his account was probably the most detailed and reliable ever written of the history of the successors.¹⁵² Modern research has shown that Diodorus in books xviii to xx relied on Hieronymus alone for his history of the successors, and that Arrian's *Successors*—though surviving mainly in Photius' epitome—also relied heavily on Hieronymus. Justin's original, Pompeius Trogus, similarly seems to have taken material largely from Hieronymus.¹⁵³ The brief 'Heidelberg *Epitome*' seems also to rely on him.¹⁵⁴

Curtius has so far been considered the odd man out. He concludes his *History of Alexander* with an account of the struggles after Alexander's death, which culminated in the settlement of Babylon. His account is only a few pages long, but it remains the most detailed extant version of these crucial events.¹⁵⁵ Fontana, who has most recently discussed it, echoes earlier judgements in concluding that it contains little of value.¹⁵⁶ Rhetoric was intended to entertain the reader, and Curtius is rhetorical. The modern reaction has accordingly been to despise Curtius as an entertainer, and to believe that, because of the form in which it is presented, his information must be equally frivolous. Curtius clearly did his own writing: he did not slavishly copy his sources. He also did his own thinking, with the result that his account is the most coherent approach to an interpretation which we possess. The facts on which this interpretation is based cannot simply be written off as novelletish and unreliable.¹⁵⁷ Curtius' is a sophisticated version, the version of a Roman man of affairs; and if we can believe the most reasonable modern theory about his identity, he will have experienced, by the time he wrote these chapters, the accessions of Tiberius,

¹⁵² Fragments in *FGrH* 154; the whole material reviewed by Brown, *AHR* lii (1946-7) 684 ff.

¹⁵³ On these cf. Fontana, *Lotte* 259 ff.; on D. xviii 1-4, cf. Schachermeyr, *JOAI* xli (1954) 118 f. (= Griffith, *Alexander the Great* 322 ff.); Badian, *HSPH* lxxii (1967) 183 ff.

¹⁵⁴ *FGrH* 155, with Jacoby's commentary.

¹⁵⁵ C. x 6.1-10.8: this is interwoven (clearly by C. himself) with his account of Alexander's death.

¹⁵⁶ *Lotte* 299 ff. (with copious bibliography).

¹⁵⁷ With, e.g., Schachermeyr, *Klio* xviii (1925)

Gaius and Claudius.¹⁵⁸ This personal experience affected his view of the succession to Alexander.

From which source—or sources—did Curtius take his information? Can it be traced, in the last resort, to anyone who was actually present at Babylon? Is there any reason for doubting that, in essentials—the factual outline—it comes from Hieronymus? It is unrewarding and unproductive to follow authority and spend yet more time in discrediting Curtius by emphasising his obvious rhetorical defects. Let us rather test the arguments which have been brought against his reliability with the positive assumption that his information in these chapters is, within the limits imposed by his technique and his interpretation, reliable unless decisively shown to be otherwise.

Curtius clearly wrote his account of events at Babylon with a full understanding of the events which followed Alexander's death. There is no reason why he should have restricted himself for information on events at Babylon to those authors whom he had already read for the main part of his work on Alexander. Fontana argues that it is more 'logical' to assume that Curtius used the same sources here as before. Since only Duris—as far as we know—had this kind of detail on both Alexander and the successors, Duris must have been chiefly used by Curtius. This is a convenient way of disposing of Curtius, as long as we also accept the unsatisfactory assumption that Duris must always be wrong (but Fontana also thinks that Duris used Hieronymus, which stultifies her own argument!). In any case, her scheme is far too tidy. Curtius, it is clear, was a widely read man; and it is far less reasonable to believe that he should have used the one source who happens to be known to us who wrote on both Alexander and the successors, than it is that he should have read the standard works on the period on which he was writing. There was no lack of surviving information in the first century A.D., for Arrian, writing in the second, managed to write ten books on the events of the three years between Babylon and Antipater's return to Europe after Triparadeisos. The amount of detailed—and substantially correct—prosopographical information in the rest of Curtius' *History of Alexander* should be sufficient warning that he was not the man to shirk his reading where material was readily available.¹⁵⁹

There is therefore no *a priori* reason why Hieronymus should not have been Curtius' chief source for these chapters. Schwahn's arguments against this are insufficiently detailed and too much influenced by the fashionable denigration of Curtius. Duris is his choice also, but a Duris who used information taken from a more or less uncommitted—perhaps Greek mercenary—source. Schwahn's brief and unappreciative analysis nevertheless admits by this that Curtius shows knowledge of inside information.¹⁶⁰ We cannot join Schwahn in postulating an unknown Greek mercenary source—an unlikely enough event for this internal Macedonian struggle—when Eumenes is known to have been present, to have claimed impartiality, and to have been Hieronymus' informant.¹⁶¹ Schwahn's analysis not only leaves open the field for Hieronymus, but actually finds features in Curtius' account which can most satisfactorily be explained by assuming that Hieronymus was Curtius' source.

Fontana's examination is more detailed. Justin, who she thinks preserves pure

¹⁵⁸ See, most recently, Sumner, *AUMLA* xv (1961) 30 ff., who identifies C. with the *novus homo* of Tac. *Ann.* xi 20 f. and Plin. *Ep.* vii 27, and the rhetorician in Suet. *de rhet.* (index). The book would be written under Gaius and Claudius, the end of book x shortly after Claudius' accession. Milns, *Latomus* xxv (1966) 490 ff. argues for Galba. But unconvincingly: he deals adequately neither with the prosopographical problem nor *eiusdem domus* of C. x 9.6. Full discussion of literature up to 1958 in Korzeniewski, *Die Zeit des Quintus Curtius Rufus* (Diss. Köln, 1959); to

which add also Instinsky, *Hermes* xc (1962) 379 ff. (Vespasian); Verdière, *WS* lxxix (1966) 490 ff. (Nero); Scheda, *Historia* xviii (1969) 380-3 (Vespasian).

¹⁵⁹ Fontana, *Lotte* 300. C. knows, for instance, historians who alleged that Alexander's will distributed the satrapies—a view which he rightly rejects. But he had read them: x 10.5.

¹⁶⁰ Schwahn, *Klio* xxiii (1930) 236 f.

¹⁶¹ Plut. *Eumenes* 3.1-2 (for instance).

Hieronimus, is the closest of the extant sources in general outline to Curtius—which is perhaps scarcely surprising since Justin is the only source which provides a similar quantity of detail about events at Babylon. There are substantial differences, both in scale and in detail, but the scale may most satisfactorily be explained by Justin's brevity, the detail by his penchant for error. Overall the impression, we must agree with Fontana, is that both Trogus and Curtius used a similar outline source. Curtius had, however, read more than one account of the events he relates, since he rejects the view of some authors (whom he does not name) that the distribution of the satrapies was part of Alexander's will: no other source, not even Justin, mentions this aberration. Curtius had read it and rejected it, and must therefore, at least at this point, have made a (good) conscious choice of his chief source.

During the first discussions at Babylon Curtius records a speech by Nearchus which claims that Alexander's son by Barsine, Heracles, should be given precedence to Roxane's unborn child. Nearchus' view found little support and it was dropped.¹⁶² Tarn argued that Heracles, son of Barsine, when 'discovered' by Polyperchon in 310, was falsely put up as a pretender, and hence that no Heracles, son of Barsine, had ever existed. His view has met little favour.¹⁶³ Whatever the truth about the Heracles of 310/09, it provides no argument at all for a son of Alexander called Heracles never having existed. Polyperchon's scheme, on Tarn's view, must have been doomed to failure from the start, for propaganda, however false, needs to be rooted in truth to make it feasible. Yet the scheme did not fail. Heracles was abandoned, not because people did not believe in his origin, but because Cassander took the threat seriously enough to come to an agreement with Polyperchon whereby Heracles was murdered.¹⁶⁴ These events are accordingly *prima facie* evidence for Alexander's having had a son Heracles. Nearchus, we know, had married a daughter of Barsine, a half-sister of Heracles, and therefore stood to gain substantial advantages from Heracles' adoption as Macedonian king.¹⁶⁵ The evidence makes admirable sense, and we should not allow Tarn's moralistic prejudices about the 'impossibility' of Barsine's having been Alexander's official concubine before his marriage with Roxane to remove Heracles from history.

Since Heracles existed there is no reason why Nearchus' speech in Curtius should not have originated in the reliable Hieronymus, who presumably also featured the debate at length. Fontana argues for a more dramatic source;¹⁶⁶ but the drama of the scene could be competently added by Curtius himself. Justin also mentions Barsine's son, but makes the proposal Meleager's.¹⁶⁷ errors of name—the substitution of one known name for another—are so common in Justin that they cannot be used as evidence for a different source. Similarly, the fact that Diodorus mentions neither Nearchus nor his proposal is unimportant, for Diodorus says practically nothing about the debate. Nearchus' proposal is not therefore evidence for any source other than Hieronymus.

Fontana next disbelieves Curtius' version of Ptolemy's proposal that a committee of Alexander's advisers should be joint rulers of the empire and should hold their meetings in the presence of Alexander's throne. Fontana says this could never have been proposed in a Macedonian assembly since it implied the dismemberment of the empire—an implication which is difficult to see. Her conclusion is that the dramatic source built this up from *ex eventu* knowledge of Eumenes' later success with a very similar scheme.¹⁶⁸ This is quite unnecessary. Ptolemy's proposal is explicable in its context: he saw his own advantage

¹⁶² C. x 6.10–12.

¹⁶³ Tarn, *JHS* xli (1921) 18 ff., rejected by Berve, *Das Alexanderreich* ii, 102 f., but restated with some new but still quite unconvincing points by Tarn in *Alexander the Great* ii 330 ff.

¹⁶⁴ D. xx 28.

¹⁶⁵ Refs. in Berve, *Das Alexanderreich* ii, 271 and n. 3.

¹⁶⁶ Fontana, *Lotte* 302.

¹⁶⁷ J. xiii 2.6 ff.

¹⁶⁸ *Lotte* 304 ff. For Eumenes in 318, cf. D. xviii 60.4–61.3; Plut. *Eumenes* 13.

in its acceptance since he was likely to lose influence should Perdikkas immediately consolidate his position. It is clearly absurd to suggest that a proposal which had later success with a Macedonian army when proposed by a Greek could not be made by a Macedonian in this Macedonian assembly. Eumenes clearly took his idea from Ptolemy's defeated proposal. Again, Hieronymus can easily have recorded this—and it is difficult to see why anyone should have invented it.

From these trivial points and some further variations from Justin's account—which is confused and abbreviated to the point of practical uselessness—Fontana concludes that the dramatic aspects of Curtius can only have come from Duris; that the traces of Hieronymus—which even she cannot deny—are transmitted through Duris; but that Justin, because of his variations from Curtius—which might more reasonably be attributed to his own incompetence—preserves some sections of the original Hieronymus. This conclusion is quite unnecessary and unacceptable. As we have seen, Curtius' facts have a perfectly good claim to be considered reliable. We have found nothing—apart from his rhetoric and personal interpretation—which *cannot* claim Hieronymus as provenance. No one who has read the Alexander sections of Curtius' work will be convinced that Curtius needed Duris' help to add drama to the narrative; and we have Curtius' own word that he had read—at least—more than one account of the struggle at Babylon. He may indeed have read Duris; he may have read and used other sources which are not known to us by name; he certainly used their information in his own way. But no real evidence has been assembled which should cast serious doubt on the reliability of Curtius' factual outline. This does not mean that Curtius is necessarily correct in every detail, or that he gives a complete account of Hieronymus' version of these events. This is clearly not so: Curtius omits details which Diodorus and/or Arrian record. But this is scarcely surprising: his account, like theirs, is a shorter, tailored version of Hieronymus', and we must conclude, not that Curtius could not have given those details, but that he decided not to, because they would not fit the 'economy' of his work, just as Diodorus and Arrian in their own ways have selected their information from Hieronymus. Far from rejecting Curtius' account as valueless, therefore, we should be grateful that his intelligent and coherent account has survived.

APPENDIX 2: CHRONOLOGY

The chronology of the early relationships of the *diadochi* has never been satisfactorily elucidated in its entirety. It is time to state the reasons for the chronology adopted above.

Alexander died on the evening of 10th June, 323.¹⁶⁹ From then until Triparadeisos there are few fixed points, which it will be best to establish first. Triparadeisos has been firmly fixed by Manni as being after May 320.¹⁷⁰ The Babylonian chronicle of the *diadochi* records the death of Perdikkas in the next line after mentioning a battle with Ptolemy¹⁷¹ in Aiuru of year 4 of Philip Arrhidaeus (320/19):¹⁷² in 320 Aiuru began on 11th May (Julian).¹⁷³ This places Perdikkas' death in May or June of 320, since his death followed soon after his battle with Ptolemy. The *Marmor Parium* agrees when it puts Perdikkas' death in the Athenian archonship of Archippus (321/0),¹⁷⁴ therefore before c. July 320. Triparadeisos was after this—Diodorus' narrative suggests quite a short time, but it is too vague to be sure. It was, however, some time before the Babylonian New Year of 319

¹⁶⁹ A Babylonian astronomical date: 'month II, Babylonian day 29'. Cf. Samuel, *Ptolemaic Chronology* (Munich, 1962) 46-7, who points out that this replaces Beloch's widely accepted 13th June.

¹⁷⁰ *RAL* ser. 8, iv (1949) 53 ff. against the traditional date of 321.

¹⁷¹ Cf. D. xviii 36.6-34.5.

¹⁷² 'A Babylonian Chronicle concerning the

Diadochi', obv. lines 4-5, in S. Smith, *Babylonian Historical Texts* (Methuen, London 1924) 142-4. Italian translation by Furlani in *RFIC* lx (1932) 462 ff.

¹⁷³ Table in Parker and Dubberstein, *Babylonian Chronology*² (Chicago, 1945) 34.

¹⁷⁴ *Marmor Parium* (*FGrH* 239) B 11.

(Nisanu 1st = 1st April 319)¹⁷⁵ since 'the satrap of Akkad', almost certainly the newly appointed Seleucus, is recorded as having arrived at Babylon still in year 4 of Philip Arrhidaeus.¹⁷⁶ Diodorus, whose chronology is more than usually haphazard at this point—he omits altogether the archonships of Archippus and his successor Neaechmus—does not necessarily conflict with this. Triparadeisos is accordingly fixed for late summer or autumn 320.

A second fixed point is the date of the establishment of Antipater's garrison at Munychia after the Lamian War. The year is 322, the second year of the war which began soon after Alexander's death, the precise (Athenian) date, 20th Boedromion.¹⁷⁷ This cannot safely be expressed precisely in Julian terms, but for the present purpose it is sufficient to note that the date represents the early autumn, late September or October.

The problem is now to distribute the other events we know to the interval between Autumn 322 and Perdiccas' death in May/June 320. The battle near the Hellespont, in which Eumenes killed Craterus, cannot have been more than a few weeks before Perdiccas' death, because the news of it reached Egypt only two days after Perdiccas' murder.¹⁷⁸ Since it took place soon after Antipater and Craterus crossed to Asia, their crossing must be dated to spring 320, a date which is supported by the Parian Marble's attribution to Archippus' archonship (321/0).¹⁷⁹ Diodorus says that their plans for the crossing had made them break off the Aetolian war when the winter was pressing the Aetolians hard, which the usual chronology makes winter 322/1, on the assumption that the Aetolian war continued immediately after the fall of Athens in autumn 322.¹⁸⁰ But this cannot be correct: it was clearly unnecessary for Craterus and Antipater to break off the Aetolian war if their crossing to Asia was more than a year later. The winter involved must accordingly be 321/0, and the beginning of the Aetolian war must be placed in the preceding summer, 321. This conclusion does not contradict Diodorus, who does not imply that Antipater and Craterus continued the Aetolian war *immediately* after the capitulation of Athens.¹⁸¹ Indeed, although (characteristically) Diodorus gives no time scale, the events which he briefly enumerates after Crannon suggest a far longer time. The new Athenian constitution was apparently organised and put into operation by Antipater himself; similar reorganisations in other cities, which Diodorus passes over in a sentence, again imply time and effort. Antipater also returned to Macedon where Craterus married Phila, his eldest daughter.¹⁸² Sufficient events are recorded for Antipater to fill the winter quite satisfactorily, and to cause no strain to the evidence if we conclude that the Aetolian war started in summer 321 and continued into the following winter 321/0.

This scheme equally presents little difficulty in explaining Perdiccas' movements between the discussions at Babylon and his death in May/June 320. It is improbable that he began his assault on Ariarathes in 323. He did not set out until it became clear that Leonnatus and Antigonus would not help Eumenes; Ariarathes had sufficient notice to gather a large army; and it took Perdiccas two battles to defeat him. He then spent time in 'arranging the affairs of Cappadocia'—clearly a more complicated business than Diodorus' phrase suggests—and only then did he hand over the satrapy to Eumenes.¹⁸³ There was no time for all this in 323. Diodorus, in fact, quite clearly attaches Perdiccas' Cappadocian

¹⁷⁵ Parker and Dubberstein, *ibid.*

¹⁷⁶ Bab. Chron. line 5.

¹⁷⁷ Plut. *Phocion* 28.

¹⁷⁸ D. xviii 37.1. Before his death Perdiccas had had news of Eumenes' battle with Neoptolemus (see above, n. 127) which was 'about ten days' before that with Craterus (Plut. *Eumenes* 8.1).

¹⁷⁹ D. xviii 29.4; *Marmor Parium* B 11.

¹⁸⁰ D. xviii 25.3-4. Even Manni, *Demetrio*

Poliorcete (Rome, 1951) 73 f., explains D.'s winter as late 322/1, and places the peace in summer 321. But D.'s narrative states explicitly that the war continued into a winter, and was only broken off to prepare for the crossing to Asia.

¹⁸¹ Noticed by Manni, *Demetrio Poliorcete* 75, though it produces difficulties for him.

¹⁸² D. xviii 18.

¹⁸³ Plut. *Eumenes* 3.2 f.; A. *succ.* 11; D. xviii 16.2-3.

activities to his account of the second campaign of the Lamian war (322).¹⁸⁴ There is no reason to reject this connexion.

Diodorus also makes Craterus' departure from Cilicia approximately contemporary with Perdiccas' Cappadocian activity.¹⁸⁵ Since we know that Craterus arrived in Greece in summer 322, in time to participate in the battle of Crannon,¹⁸⁶ we can accept Diodorus' vague indication that he left Cilicia in spring or summer 322.

The time of Perdiccas' activities in Pisidia is not clearly indicated. Diodorus says simply that they were after he had finished in Cappadocia.¹⁸⁷ Let us approach the problem from another angle. Some time towards the end of 321, during the Aetolian war of Craterus and Antipater, Antigonus arrived in Greece.¹⁸⁸ The reason for his flight was that Perdiccas' activities had made his position untenable. Since Diodorus records Antigonus' flight soon after Perdiccas' destruction of the Pisidian cities, with which the arrivals of Nicaea, Cleopatra, and Cynnane were approximately contemporary,¹⁸⁹ it seems reasonably clear that Perdiccas' Pisidian activities should be placed in the spring of 321. This means that the women arrived in summer 321, which leaves sufficient time for Antigonus to feel insecure, and to make him take flight to Antipater and Craterus during the summer to arrive during the Aetolian war.¹⁹⁰

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¹⁸⁴ D. xviii 16.1: ἅμα δὲ τούτοις πραττομένοις.

¹⁸⁵ D. xviii 16.4: ὑπὸ δὲ τοῖς αὐτοῖς καιροῖς.

¹⁸⁶ D. xviii 16.4 ff.

¹⁸⁷ D. xviii 22.1.

¹⁸⁸ D. xviii 23.4–24.1.

¹⁸⁹ D. xviii 23.1; cf. A. succ. 21.

¹⁹⁰ I am grateful to Professor E. Badian for

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